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The Polymorphic Principle
and the Judicial Role
in Statutory Interpretation
by Jonathan R. Siegel
[We decline to] establish within our jurisprudence, beyond
the power of Congress to remedy, the dangerous principle
that judges can give the same statutory text different
meanings in different cases.
Clark v. Martinez, 125 S. Ct. 716, 727 (2005).
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation cases present an ongoing
clash among methods of statutory interpretation—a clash that reflects a
larger dispute over the proper judicial role in our system of government.
On the one side, the textualists tend to prefer mechanical, rules-based
methods of interpretation that, at least ostensibly, minimize the role of
judicial choice in the interpretive process.1 The other side, often (though
not invariably) in the name of implementing congressional intent, prefers a
more flexible, standards-based approach, which calls upon courts to make
intelligent choices and, on appropriate occasions, to deviate from the most
straightforward or canonical reading of statutory text in order to reach the
most appropriate result.2 The two sides thus have different visions of the
judicial role.
In this ongoing clash among interpretive methods, the textualists
recently won another battle. Indeed, their victory was unusually powerful.
Not only did Justice Scalia convince the Supreme Court to resolve a case
on textualist grounds, he convinced six other Justices to join an opinion
Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.
University; J.D. Yale Law School.

A.B. Harvard

1

Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 Va. L. Rev. 347, 350, 374-403 (2005).

2

Id. at 349, 398.

stating that a particular textualist rule of statutory construction is so strong
that it must always apply; courts lack power to deviate from it.
The case, Clark v. Martinez,3 turned on the question of whether a
single term in a single statutory provision must always have a single
meaning. If, for example, a statute takes the form, “if (A or B), then C,”
must C have the same meaning in cases involving A as in cases involving
B? In Martinez, the Supreme Court said the answer is always yes.4
Like so many issues of statutory interpretation, this seemingly simple
question implicates the largest issues, both of statutory interpretation and,
ultimately, the proper judicial role in our system of government. Martinez
presents, in perfect microcosm, the general clash over interpretive
methodologies. It is notable on two levels, first, for its creation of a new
and unique canon of statutory construction, and second, for what it says
about the Supreme Court’s understanding of the judicial role. This Article
explores Martinez on both levels, using the case as a window into the
larger questions of statutory interpretation and the separation of powers.
First, the Article explores whether there is really a canon of statutory
construction that requires courts to determine that a single phrase in a
single statutory provision always has a single meaning—a canon that this
article will refer to as the strong unitary principle. Scholars have long
considered the canons of construction as a fruitful field of study,5 but the
question of this particular canon’s existence has received but little
attention.6 With Martinez, the question bursts forth as a general issue in
3

125 S. Ct. 716 (2005).

4

Id. at 722-27.

5

E.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 25-29 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 990, 1099-1105
(2001); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1,
108-26 (2001); Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative
Law, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 1023, 1043-44 (1998); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules
of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2085, 2148-50 (2002); Karl N. Llewellyn,
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How
Statutes are to be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950).
6

The question was the subject of a recent scholarly symposium exchange with regard to
constitutional text. Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the
Presumption of Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 1149 (2003); Adrian
Vermeule, Three Commerce Clauses? No Problem, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 1175 (2003). With
regard to statutory interpretation, the question has previously been addressed primarily in
the context of statutes that impose both civil liability and criminal penalties for specified
conduct; scholars have examined whether, in such statutes, the provisions specifying the
forbidden conduct must receive a uniform interpretation that applies to both civil and
criminal cases. Lawrence M. Solan, Statutory Inflation and Institutional Choice, 44 Wm.
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statutory interpretation. The Supreme Court not only determined that it
would read the statute before it in accordance with the strong unitary
principle, but it held that the principle must always apply.7 The Court
asserted that any contrary interpretive approach would be “novel” and
“dangerous.”8
This Article first shows that the Court erred in its descriptive claim
that departure from the strong unitary principle would be “novel.” In
numerous cases, courts, including the Supreme Court, have applied the
contrary principle that a single term or phrase in a single statutory
provision may have multiple meanings—an interpretive approach that this
article will call the polymorphic principle. As this Article will show,
courts employ the polymorphic principle in a variety of situations, most
commonly when some special rule of statutory interpretation calls for a
special construction of statutory text in one circumstance, but has no
application in other circumstances.9 Courts also sometimes employ the
polymorphic principle when necessary as a pure policy matter.10
The Article then takes on the Court’s normative assertion that the
polymorphic principle is “dangerous.” The choice between the strong
unitary principle and the polymorphic principle, this Article shows,
implicates the most fundamental questions concerning the proper judicial
role in our system of government.11 The Martinez opinion, this Article
suggests, cannot be understood independently of the identity of its author,
Justice Scalia. The opinion does not simply endorse a particular rule of
statutory construction; it represents a stage in Justice Scalia’s long-term
campaign to limit judicial choice. By taking away judicial discretion to
give a single piece of statutory text multiple meanings, Justice Scalia
hopes to further his ultimate goal of limiting the judicial role in our system
of government.
This Article attempts to show that Justice Scalia’s campaign and his
consequent embrace of the strong unitary principle are misguided. It is an
& Mary L. Rev. 2209 (2003); Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and Criminal
Enforcement of Federal Regulatory Statutes: The Case of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1025 (2001).
7

125 S. Ct. at 724.

8

Id. at 725, 727.

9

See infra Parts II.B.1, 2 (describing cases of “constitutional avoidance” polymorphism
and “subconstitutional” polymorphism).
10

See infra Part II.B.3 (describing cases of “policy” polymorphism).

11

For some previous commentary, see John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory
Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1648 (2001); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621 (1990); Jonathan R. Siegel,
What Statutory Drafting Errors Teach Us About Statutory Interpretation, 69 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 309 (2001).
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error, this Article suggests, to attempt to mechanize the judicial role in
statutory interpretation and drive out the necessity for intelligent judicial
choice.12 The Constitution permits the exercise of the degree of judicial
choice necessary to implement the polymorphic principle.13 Moreover, as
with so many textualist practices, the strong unitary principle does not, in
fact, limit judicial choice; it only presents the illusion of doing so.14
Indeed, ironically, the strong unitary principle would often have the effect
of magnifying the role of judicial choice in statutory interpretation.15
Thus, even those who seek to limit the role of judicial choice wherever
possible should be reluctant to embrace it.
Part I of this Article describes Clark v. Martinez and its endorsement
of the strong unitary principle. Part II then demonstrates, as a descriptive
matter, that courts in fact employ the contrary polymorphic principle. Part
II analyzes the different categories of cases in which the polymorphic
principle appears and the motivations that drive courts to employ it.
Part III then considers the conflict between the polymorphic principle
and the strong unitary principle as a normative matter. This Part views the
conflict in the larger context of general theories of statutory interpretation.
The Constitution, this Part attempts to show, does not compel Justice
Scalia’s textualist theory of interpretation; nor does it forbid the degree of
judicial choice necessary to implementation of the polymorphic principle.
Part IV concludes by considering the likely future of the polymorphic
principle. Although Martinez appears very clearly to embrace the strong
unitary principle, this Part suggests that the Supreme Court lacks firm
commitment in methodological matters and that it will probably revert to
the polymorphic principle in the future when the occasion so demands.
Accordingly, this Part attempts to give some guidance as to the
appropriate use of the polymorphic principle in particular cases and,
finally, to explore whether Congress should play a role in choosing
between the polymorphic principle and the strong unitary principle.
I. CLARK v. MARTINEZ AND THE UNITARY PRINCIPLE
The Supreme Court has always recognized that the terms in any
federal statutory provision take their meaning, in part, from the context
provided by the entire statute. A particular aspect of this general principle
is the long-standing presumption that if a word or phrase occurs multiple

12

See infra Parts III.B, III.C.

13

See infra Part III.C.2.

14

See infra Part III.C.3.

15

See infra Part III.C.4.
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times in a statute, it has the same meaning each time.16 Professor Akhil
Amar recently called attention to the importance of drawing inferences
from multiple appearances of the same or similar terms in the same legal
document. He dubbed this interpretive technique “intratextualism” and
explored its use in constitutional interpretation.17
The presumption that recurring words or phrases have the same
meaning each time they appear gathers strength as the multiple
appearances approach each other in statutory proximity. There is some
inference that words have consistent meanings throughout the United
States Code, but the inference becomes a presumption only when a term
occurs multiple times within a single statute.18 Moreover, distinctions
arise even within such cases: where a term recurs multiple times in
closely proximate statutory provisions, the courts will apply the
presumption more strongly than when a term recurs in distantly separated
sections of the same statute.19 Recognizing the significance of still closer
statutory proximity, the Court has said that the presumption is “at its most
vigorous” when a term appears multiple times within a single statutory
sentence.20
Even recurrent appearance multiple times within a single sentence
does not, however, quite represent the ultimate in potential statutory
proximity. Sometimes, a term occurs a single time in a single statutory
provision, but courts must interpret the term in different cases presenting
different circumstances. The question then arises whether the single term
must always have a single meaning.
A. The (Weak) Unitary Principle
Given that courts presume that a single term has a single meaning
when it recurs multiple times within a statute and that they apply this
presumption more and more strongly as the multiple occurrences of the
term approach each other in statutory proximity, it is no surprise to
discover that courts usually determine that a term occurring a single time
16

E.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496
U.S. 478, 484 (1990); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States., 286 U.S. 427, 433
(1932).
17

See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747 (1999).

18

Firstar Bank, N.A. v. Faul, 253 F.3d 982, 991 (7th Cir. 2001) (inference that words
recurring in different statutes have the same meaning is “relatively weak”).

19

See Commissioner v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 250 (1996) (noting the “close proximity of
the[] provisions of the statute” involved). Another form of proximity is temporal; the
presumption may apply when Congress uses the same language in two different statutes
if it enacts one shortly after the other. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. ___, slip op. at
4 (2005) (plurality opinion).
20

Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994).
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in a single statutory provision should have a single meaning. This rule of
statutory interpretation will be called the “unitary principle.”21 To the
extent that this principle serves as one indicator of statutory meaning but is
not always dispositive in every case to which it applies, the principle will
be called the “weak unitary principle.”
A couple of examples will serve to establish the principle’s existence
and demonstrate its operation. The Supreme Court recently had occasion
to apply the unitary principle when construing section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board.22 In a state or
political subdivision subject to the Act’s “preclearance” requirement,
Section 5 authorizes judicial preclearance of a proposed change in voting
practices provided the proposed change “does not have the purpose and
will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color.”23 Bossier Parish posed the question of whether
a court could preclear a voting change that had a dilutive, but
nonretrogressive, purpose (that is, the change had the purpose of creating a
voting scheme that diluted minority votes, but no more so than the existing
scheme).24
The Court first observed that it had previously held that a dilutive
voting change has the effect of “denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color” within the meaning of section 5 only if the
change is retrogressive.25 The Court then resolved Bossier Parish by
applying the unitary principle. Section 5, the Court noted, ties the single
phrase, “denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color,” to two possible triggers, “purpose” and “effect.” Having
previously held that the quoted phrase covered only retrogressive changes
with regard to “effect,” the Court held that the phrase had the same limited
meaning with regard to “purpose.” The Court noted that a contrary
interpretation would be “simply an untenable construction of the text,”26
and that the Court would “refuse to adopt a construction that would
attribute different meanings to the same phrase in the same sentence,
depending on which object it is modifying.”27

21

Prakash refers to this principle as the “presumption of intrasentence uniformity,”
Prakash, supra note 6, at 1149, but the “unitary principle” provides a better linguistic
match with the “polymorphic principle.”

22

528 U.S. 320 (2000).

23

5 U.S.C. § 1973c; see Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000).

24

See 528 U.S. at 335.

25

See 528 U.S. at 329 (citing Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976)).

26

528 U.S. at 329.

27

Id.
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The Court applied the same principle in Bankamerica Corp. v. United
States,28 which required it to interpret the prohibition, contained in section
8 of the Clayton Act, against interlocking corporate directorates among
competing companies “other than banks, banking associations, trust
companies, and common carriers.”29 The question was whether this
exemption permitted interlocking directorates between any two companies
at least one of which was a bank, or whether the exemption applied only
when both companies were banks. The Court solved the case by
combining a concession with the unitary principle. The United States
conceded that the exemption permitted interlocking directorates between
any two corporations, at least one of which was a common carrier. The
Court concluded that the same rule must apply to banks. The Court said,
“[W]e reject as unreasonable the contention that Congress intended the
phrase ‘other than’ to mean one thing when applied to ‘banks’ and another
thing as applied to ‘common carriers,’ where the phrase ‘other than’
modifies both words in the same clause.”30
Both these cases demonstrate that a single term in a single statutory
provision should normally have a single meaning. If a previous case, a
party’s concession, or, presumably, ordinary principles of construction
establish that a statutory term has a particular meaning under given
circumstances (as, for example, when it interacts with some particular
other statutory text), its meaning should not change with changing
circumstances. So, if a statute takes the form, “if (A or B) then C,” and
courts have established that C has a particular meaning in cases involving
A, the unitary principle would indicate that C should have that same
meaning in cases involving B.
The unitary principle has not received much attention, except for the
case of statutes that have both civil and criminal applications. If a statute
forbids certain conduct and attaches both civil liability and criminal
penalties to that conduct, the question may arise whether the civil
liabilities and criminal penalties attach to precisely the same conduct.
Normally, if the statute makes no differentiation between the two, one
would assume the answer to be yes. Consider, for example, a statute of
the form:

28

462 U.S. 122 (1983).

29

15 U.S.C. § 19.

30

462 U.S. at 129.
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§ 1.
§ 2.
§ 3.

Conduct X is forbidden.
Any person who violates § 1 shall be liable to any
injured party for the resulting damages.
Any person convicted of violating § 1 shall be
sentenced to a term of 1 year in prison.

One would normally assume that § 1 had a single meaning that would
apply both to civil actions under § 2 and criminal prosecutions under § 3.
This assumption, however, may have a peculiar result when it interacts
with the rule of lenity, a principle of statutory interpretation applicable to
criminal statutes. If § 1 is ambiguous, the rule of lenity calls for it to
receive a narrow construction, so that the public has fair warning of
conduct that could result in a criminal sanction.31 In such a case, if the
best understanding of § 1 is broader, must courts nonetheless give the
section a narrow construction, even in civil cases arising under § 2, so that
the section can have a single meaning? The most common answer given
by courts and scholars is yes: the combined effect of the unitary principle
and the rule of lenity requires narrow construction, even in civil cases, of
ambiguous statutes that impose civil and criminal sanctions on the same
conduct.32
The cases discussed above show that the issue of properly interpreting
a “mixed” civil/criminal statute is just one aspect of a more general issue
in statutory interpretation. More generally, the question is whether a
single term in a single statutory provision should have a single meaning,
even when that term must interact with multiple, other statutory provisions
in different circumstances. The unitary principle says that the answer is
normally yes.

31

E.g., Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 409 (2003)
(“[W]hen there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other,
we are to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite
language.”) (internal quotation omitted).
32

E.g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, 125 S. Ct. 377, 384 n.8 (applying the rule of lenity in a
deportation case, because the statute at issue also applied to criminal cases); United States
v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517-518 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(applying the rule of lenity in a tax case to a statute that also imposed criminal penalties);
Federal Communications Commission v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284, 296
(1954) (applying rule of lenity in a civil, administrative setting; “There cannot be one
construction for the Federal Communications Commission and another for the
Department of Justice.”); Sachs, supra note 6, at 1030-33.
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B. The Strong Unitary Principle
The cases discussed so far applied the unitary principle as an ordinary
principle of construction that provides one indicator of the most likely
meaning of statutory text. Neither Bossier Parish nor Bankamerica
suggested that courts must regard the unitary principle as completely
inviolable. Nor did either case suggest that a court’s disregard for the
principle would implicate the separation of powers.
This past Term, however, the Supreme Court took the unitary principle
to a new level. The Court declared that the unitary principle is not simply
one indicator of statutory meaning, but an inviolable decree. The Court
determined not only that a single term in a single statutory provision
should normally have a single meaning, but that it must always have a
single meaning, and that any suggestion to the contrary is “novel” and
“dangerous” and an affront to the separation of powers. This new
principle will be called the strong unitary principle.
The occasion for the Court’s enunciation of its new principle arose in
Clark v. Martinez, an immigration case.33 The case concerned the
problem of aliens held in detention for long periods of time pending
removal from the country. Once a final order for removal of an alien is
entered, the government normally removes the alien during a 90-day
“removal period” fixed by statute.34 Sometimes, however, problems arise,
as, for example, when no other country agrees to receive the alien.35 In
such cases, the government may rely on a statutory provision that
authorizes it to detain an alien beyond the removal period. The applicable
statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231, provides:
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1182
of this title, removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or
1227(a)(4) of this title or who has been determined by the Attorney
General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with
the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal
period.36
When an alien fell within the statute, and no other country would receive
the alien, the government maintained that it had the authority to detain the
alien indefinitely, and, in some cases, detained such aliens for years.37

33

125 S. Ct. 716 (2005).

34

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A); see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001).

35

See, e.g., 533 U.S. at 684-86 (describing two such cases).

36

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (emphasis added).

37

See, e.g., 533 U.S. at 684-86 (describing such cases).
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The question therefore arose whether the statutory provision stating that
the Attorney General “may” detain certain aliens “beyond the removal
period” authorized indefinite detentions.
The Supreme Court had previously addressed this question in
Zadvydas v. Davis,38 a case involving aliens who had been admitted to the
United States but who subsequently became removable under one of the
statutory provisions listed in § 1231.39 As to such aliens, the Court
determined, indefinite detention would raise a serious constitutional
concern, because it would invade the core of the “liberty” protected by the
Due Process Clause.40 Without actually holding such indefinite detention
unconstitutional, the Court invoked the interpretive principle of
“constitutional avoidance.”41 Over a strenuous, four-Justice dissent that
argued that its reading of § 1231 was implausible and simply bore “no
relation to the text,”42 the Court determined that § 1231 implicitly limited
detention to the period reasonably necessary to secure an alien’s removal
and did not authorize detention after removal was no longer reasonably
foreseeable.43 This reading of § 1231 avoided the serious constitutional
problem posed by the government’s claim of authority to detain aliens
indefinitely.
In an apparent limitation of its holding, however, the Court noted that
the case concerned removable aliens, that is, aliens admitted to the United
States who later became subject to deportation. Aliens never admitted to
the United States would, the Court said, “present a very different
question.”44 This express reservation suggested that indefinite detention
of inadmissible aliens might pose a lesser constitutional concern and that
the Court might give § 1231 a more straightforward, textual reading as to
such aliens.
Not long thereafter, Martinez presented just the question the Court had
apparently reserved: the question of indefinite detention of inadmissible
aliens. Such aliens, like removable aliens, pose a problem if their actual
removal cannot be achieved. The case concerned an alien from Cuba who,
after being ruled inadmissible, was held beyond the 90-day removal period
38

533 U.S. 678 (2001).

39

533 U.S. at 682.

40

Id. at 690.

41

This interpretive doctrine provides that “where a statute is susceptible of two
constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by
the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.” Jones v.
United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999) (internal quotation omitted).

42

533 U.S. at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

43

Id. at 699-702.

44

Id. at 682.
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because Cuba would not receive him.45 The government reminded the
Court that it had, in Zadvydas, called this a “very different question”46 and
argued that the differences between inadmissible and removable aliens
dictated a different statutory result.
The government must have been rather surprised by the outcome.
Although the Court had expressly reserved the question of inadmissible
aliens in Zadvydas, the Court, speaking through Justice Scalia, now held
that reservation to be utterly ineffective. The dispositive point, the Court
said, was the unitary principle. The Court noted that the statutory phrase,
“may be detained beyond the removal period,” applies without
differentiation to all categories of aliens mentioned in § 1231. This single
phrase, the Court held, must have a single meaning. Because § 1231 boils
down to saying that “aliens in category A, B, or C may be detained beyond
the removal period,” and because the Court had previously interpreted the
phrase “may be detained beyond the removal period” in connection with
category B, the phrase must have the same meaning in connection with
category A.47
The Court did not apply the unitary principle as it had in previous
cases, as one indicator of statutory meaning. The Court held that the
unitary principle is entirely determinative of statutory meaning.
Moreover, the Court declared that deviations from the principle cannot be
tolerated because they would be an affront to the separation of powers.
Having observed that the critical statutory phrase, “may be detained
beyond the removal period,” applies without differentiation to the three
categories of aliens mentioned in § 1231, the Court said that “[t]o give
these same words a different meaning for each category would be to
invent a statute rather than interpret one.”48 The Court recognized the
interpretive problem as a general one. It noted that “[i]t is not at all
unusual to give a statute’s ambiguous language a limiting construction
called for by one of the statute’s applications, even though other of the
statute’s applications, standing alone, would not support the same
limitation.”49 In such cases, the Court said, “[t]he lowest common
denominator, as it were, must govern.”50
The Court recognized that this strong formulation of the unitary
45

The alien had actually lived in the United States for over a decade pursuant to “parole”
granted by the Attorney General. 125 S. Ct. at 720. Such parole does not, however,
constitute “admission” of the alien. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).

46

See Brief for Respondent, Clark v. Martinez, at 27.

47

125 S. Ct. at 722-23.

48

125 S. Ct. at 722-23.

49

Id. at 724.

50

Id. (emphasis added).
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principle gives the principle great power. Under the strong unitary
principle, a court interpreting a statutory phrase cannot simply focus on
the case before it. The Court pointed out that “when deciding which of
two plausible statutory constructions to adopt, a court must consider the
necessary consequences of its choice. If one of them would raise a
multitude of constitutional problems, the other should prevail—whether or
not those constitutional problems pertain to the particular litigant before
the Court.”51
The Court severely attacked the dissent’s proposed departure from the
unitary principle. Justice Thomas, joined by the Chief Justice, asserted
that the prior holding of Zadvydas was “tethered . . . to the specific class of
aliens” involved in that case, namely, removable aliens, as to which
indefinite detention raised constitutional doubts.52 The Court, he argued,
should inquire whether reading § 1231 to permit indefinite detention of
inadmissible aliens would raise similar doubts, and interpret the statute
accordingly, even though the result might be “different detention periods
for different classes of aliens.”53 The Court sternly rejected what it called
this “novel interpretive approach,” which “would render every statute a
chameleon.”54
The Court capped off its opinion with this dire warning:
[F]or this Court to sanction indefinite detention in the face
of Zadvydas would establish within our jurisprudence,
beyond the power of Congress to remedy, the dangerous
principle that judges can give the same statutory text
different meanings in different cases.55
This is strong stuff. Not only does the Court endorse the strong
unitary principle, it appears to believe that that approach was already the
established law—witness the Court’s reference to the dissent’s approach
as “novel” and the Court’s statement that reading the statute as requested
by the dissent and the government “would establish” the principle that
judges can give the same statutory text different meanings in different
cases; i.e., that principle would be something new. The Court also calls
this allegedly novel principle “dangerous” and intimates that it would
violate the separation of powers because it would require judges to act as

51

Id. at 724.

52

125 S. Ct. at 730 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

53

Id.

54

Id. at 725.

55

Id. at 727.
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legislators.
Would departure from the unitary principle really be “novel”? Would
it be “dangerous”? The remainder of this Article address these questions.
First, the next section demonstrates that departures from the unitary
principle are not novel at all; although courts certainly apply the unitary
principle as a presumptive rule of statutory interpretation, numerous cases
shows that the presumption is defeasible. Part III then places the debate
over the unitary principle in the larger context of the debate over the
proper judicial role in statutory interpretation.
II. THE POLYMORPHIC PRINCIPLE
A review of actual judicial practices reveals that, contrary to Clark v.
Martinez, courts have not previously embraced the strong unitary
principle. Although courts usually presume that a single term employed a
single time in a single statutory provision should bear the same meaning in
all of its applications, in some cases courts determine that a single
statutory term or phrase must bear different meanings under different
circumstances. The principle that courts have the freedom to engage in
such interpretation in appropriate cases will be referred to as the
polymorphic principle.
A. Polymorphic Operators
The term “polymorphic” is borrowed from computer science.
Computers, like courts, carry out an interpretive task. Like the Supreme
Court in Martinez, computers must decide whether the symbols they
interpret have the same meaning every time, or whether a symbol’s
meaning may vary. A “polymorphic operator,” in computer science, is a
symbol that may have different meanings depending on context.
Computers carry out instructions provided by programmers in some
programming language. Computers perform this task in a fashion that
frustrates many a programmer, although some judges might consider it an
ideal to which courts ought to aspire: computers use a purely literal
method of construction. They do not consult a programmer’s intent on the
ground that her literal instructions are ambiguous or lead to an absurd
result. If a programmer instructs a computer to do something absurd, the
computer will faithfully do it.
Still, for all their maddening literalism, computers have some ability to
consider context in interpreting their instructions. It is here that they
employ the concept of polymorphic operators. Consider a simple symbol
such as “+”. Probably the reader would imagine that “+” has a single,
unambiguous meaning, but in fact matters are more complicated.
When a computer sees a line of code such as:
- 13 -

x=5+3
it understands “=” to be an assignment operator, so the code tells the
computer to compute the value of “5 + 3” and assign the result to the
variable “x”. The tricky part comes in interpreting the meaning of the
symbol “+”. In this example, the computer will, of course, understand the
symbol “+” to instruct it to add the values of the integers 5 and 3, yielding
the integer 8, the value it will assign to the variable x.
Easy enough, but what if the line of code were:
x = 5.0 + 3.0
Now the values to be added are “floating point numbers”—that is,
numbers that have both integer and decimal parts, rather than just integers.
To a human, this may seem a trivial detail, but to a computer 5 and 5.0 can
be quite different entities. In many computer languages, the internal
routines for adding 5 to 3 are entirely different from those for adding 5.0
to 3.0.56 Thus, in executing the second statement, the computer calls upon
quite different internal code than in executing the first.
An even more obviously different example would be this:
name = “John” + “Smith”
Now the items to be “added” are not numbers at all, but two series of
letters, known in the computer world as “strings.” The symbol “+” must
have a different meaning in this instruction than it did in the two
instructions given above. In most languages, the “+” operation, applied to
strings, is defined as concatenation, so that the result of the instruction
above would be to assign the string “JohnSmith” to the variable “name.”
The reader can appreciate that an entirely different sequence of
instructions would be needed to concatenate “John” and “Smith” than
would accomplish the addition of 5 and 3.
Thus, the symbol “+,” although generically representing the concept of
combination, really has three different meanings in the three examples
given above, depending on what is to be combined. It might well have
other meanings when used to instruct a computer to combine still other
kinds of items such as arrays, structures, or other data types that may exist
within a computer language.

56

These differences are summed up in the programming maxim, “1.0 + 1.0 hardly ever =
2.0.” The perils of floating-point arithmetic make it inadvisable for programmers to
check floating-point numbers for equality.
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The result is that “+” is a polymorphic operator. The computer
understands it to mean different things depending on the context. When
instructed to perform the operation “+” on two integers, the computer does
one thing (it adds them); when instructed to perform the operation “+” on
two strings, the computer does something else (it concatenates them),
using different internal code.
B. A Parade of Polymorphisms
So much for computers, let us return to statutes. As noted in Part I, the
Supreme Court asserted in Clark v. Martinez that the polymorphic
principle was “novel.” In fact, it is nothing of the kind. To be sure, courts
follow the unitary principle that a single term or phrase in a single
statutory provision should normally have a single meaning, but that is only
the weak unitary principle, which is compatible with the polymorphic
principle that courts may, in appropriate cases, give a single phrase
multiple meanings.
Instances of the polymorphic principle, though infrequent, are
sufficiently numerous that they may be grouped into useful categories.
Two dimensions of categorization are used below. First, and primarily,
the cases are grouped according to the perceived motivation for the use of
the polymorphic principle. As the examples below demonstrate, the
polymorphic principle commonly comes into play when some special
reason motivates a court to interpret a statute a particular way in one of its
applications, and the reason does not apply to other applications. The
special reason may be the need to avoid a constitutional problem
(“constitutional avoidance polymorphism”),57 a special interpretive rule
developed in the shadow of constitutional principles (“subconstitutional
polymorphism”),58 an undesirable policy result of reading the statute a
particular way in a particular circumstance (“policy polymorphism”),59 or
the desire to adhere to, but not to extend, a prior decision now perceived as
erroneous (“stare decisis polymorphism”).60
In any of these
circumstances, application of the unitary principle would force a court to
override the best reading of the statute in some cases in order to give it a
single meaning that could handle the special cases.
Within each motivational category, one may differentiate cases
according to the different ways in which the polymorphic principle can
manifest itself. Some cases present actual court holdings that a statutory
term has different meanings in different cases. Such cases will be dubbed
57

See infra Part II.B.1.

58

See infra Part II.B.2.

59

See infra Part II.B.3.

60

See infra Part II.B.4.
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cases of “express polymorphism.”61 In other cases the courts have not
expressly treated statutory text as polymorphic, but one may infer an
inclination to do so, or at least a general belief in the polymorphic
principle, on the basis of their opinions (“implied polymorphism”). Such
an inference may arise in at least two ways. First, a court or a judge may
reserve an issue for future decision in a way that would make no sense
under the strong unitary principle.62 Second, a court may employ
interpretive methods that disregard its duties under the strong unitary
principle and its “least common denominator” corollary.63 Finally, some
cases reach what appear to be polymorphic results without much
consideration of any particular statutory text. Such cases will be said to
involve “tacit polymorphism.”64
Polymorphism also arises in sources with differing degrees of
authority. Sometimes the polymorphic principle is applied by the
Supreme Court, sometimes by lower courts. Sometimes the principle may
be observed in the opinions of individual judges or Justices.
Obviously, the best evidence of the polymorphic principle is express
polymorphism in a Supreme Court holding, and such evidence is provided
below. In countering the Supreme Court’s claim that the polymorphic
principle is “novel,” however, implied polymorphism and tacit
polymorphism, as well as polymorphism in opinions of lower courts or
individual judges or Justices, provide some useful evidence. So these
appear below as well.
One last word before the parade of polymorphisms begins. Authors,
or regular readers, of articles concerning statutory interpretation will be
familiar with the problem posed by the need for examples. Scholars who
have the good fortune to write in a substantive area of law can expect most
of their readers to come to their articles armed with at least a basic
understanding of the relevant subject matter. Even if some exposition of
the subject matter is needed for the general reader, it is needed only once
per article.
Statutory interpretation scholars are different. Their domain is the
whole field of statutory law. Examples may come from any statute about
anything. Each different example may require the reader to learn fine
61

See, e.g., infra Part II.B.1.b. Cases of express polymorphism do not necessarily
contain express statements of the polymorphic principle, but they do contain actual
holdings that particular statutory text has different meanings under different
circumstances, as opposed to merely suggesting the possibility of such different
meanings.
62

See, e.g., infra Part II.B.1.a.

63

See, e.g., infra Part II.B.2.

64

See, e.g., infra Part II.B.1.c.
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points of a different statutory scheme in order to appreciate how some tiny
detail illustrates a general point about statutory interpretation.
The difficulty of learning all the details necessary to understand
numerous different statutory examples can make a statutory interpretation
article tiresome. Omit the examples, however, and the article becomes
vacuous. The tedium of too many examples, and the hollowness of too
few, are the Scylla and Charybdis between which statutory interpretation
scholars must constantly navigate.
When seven Supreme Court Justices join an opinion claiming that a
particular method of statutory interpretation is “novel,”65 the claim
demands a response. Only examples can convincingly demonstrate the
truth, which is that, whatever else the polymorphic principle may be, novel
it is not. This section attempts to present just the right number of
examples—not merely one or two, which might be dismissed as errors, but
not every available example, either. These examples illuminate not only
the existence of the polymorphic principle, but the different motivations
that underlie its use and the different forms in which it may operate. This
purely descriptive section is followed by normative analysis in Part III.
1. “Constitutional Avoidance” Polymorphism
As Martinez itself suggests, a common motivation for use of the
polymorphic principle arises when a statutory provision has one
application that raises constitutional concerns. In such a case, the
interpretive doctrine of “constitutional avoidance” counsels courts to
interpret the statute so as to avoid serious constitutional problems.66 The
strong unitary principle would then require that any phrase that receives a
particular construction so as to avoid constitutional problems in one
circumstance receive that same construction in all circumstances.
Applying that rule, however, might yield undesirable results. In such
cases, a court may choose to follow the polymorphic principle instead.
The desire to confine the impact of constitutional doubt to circumstances
in which it actually applies has given rise to polymorphism in all of its
various forms: express, implied, and tacit.
a. Implied Polymorphism: the False Claims Act
Taking the simplest example first (even though it is an example of
implied rather than express polymorphism), the polymorphic principle can
be seen in the interpretation of the False Claims Act, which prohibits the
submission of a false or fraudulent claim to the United States and provides
that any person who submits such a claim is liable for three times the
65

125 S. Ct. at 725.

66

E.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999).
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amount of damages sustained by the government.67 The Act allows
enforcement of this liability in two ways: either by an action by the
United States acting through its own officials or by a “qui tam” action, in
which a private party (known as the “relator”) brings suit in the name of
the United States and, if successful, receives a share of the proceeds.68
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel.
Stevens69 concerned the special issues raised by False Claims Act actions
against states. A private relator brought a qui tam suit against a state
agency, and the defendant claimed that it could not be sued under the Act.
The Act imposes liability on “[a]ny person” submitting a false claim,70 and
a state agency, the defendant claimed, is not a “person” under the Act.
The Supreme Court agreed. Although it relied primarily on the general
principle that the term “person” does not usually include the sovereign,71
the Court also cited the desire to avoid the potential Eleventh Amendment
difficulties that would arise from suits against a state entity initiated by
private qui tam relators.72 The Court did not hold that such suits would
violate the Eleventh Amendment, but it thought the question sufficiently
serious to invoke the principle of constitutional avoidance.73
Justice Ginsburg, however, joined by Justice Breyer, added this caveat
in a concurring opinion: Eleventh Amendment considerations would not
apply in a suit against a state initiated by federal officials, as opposed to a
qui tam relator.74 States have no immunity from suits by the United
States,75 and, in such suits, the Court has not been so reluctant to find state
entities covered by general statutory terms such as “person.”76 Justice
Ginsburg said that she “read the Court’s decision to leave open the
question whether the word ‘person’ encompasses States when the United
States itself sues under the False Claims Act.”77 In other words, she left
open the possibility that courts should treat the word “person” as a
polymorphic operator that would sometimes include states and sometimes
67

31 U.S.C. § 3729.

68

31 U.S.C. § 3730.

69

529 U.S. 765 (2000).

70

31 U.S.C. § 3729.

71

529 U.S. at 780.

72

529 U.S. at 787.

73

Id.

74

529 U.S. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

75

E.g., United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 530, 539 (1993); United States v. Texas,
143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892).

76

529 U.S. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

77

Id. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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not include them.
Of course, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion does not, by itself, show that the
term “person” in § 3729(a) is a polymorphic operator—even a statement
by the Court leaving the question open would not do that. The Court may
still someday determine that states are never “persons” under the False
Claims Act. But Justice Ginsburg’s statement that she regards the
question as open is an implied polymorphism, because it implies a belief
in the polymorphic principle. If the Court or a Justice believed in the
strong unitary principle, what business could the Court or that Justice have
leaving the question open? The strong unitary principle would require
that, once the Court has interpreted the word “person” not to include states
in cases brought by qui tam relators, the word must have the same
meaning in cases brought by federal officers. Justice Ginsburg’s
understanding that Stevens left the question open implies that she
embraces the polymorphic principle.78
Indeed, the immigration cases discussed earlier (Martinez, which
articulated the strong unitary principle, and Zadvydas, the previous case
under the same immigration statute) provide a similar example of implied
polymorphism in an opinion of the Court itself—albeit an example the
Court has now disavowed. As Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion in
Martinez observed, in Zadvydas the Court held that the statutory phrase
“may be detained beyond the removal period” prohibited indefinite
detention of removable aliens, but the Court expressly reserved the
question of that same phrase’s application to inadmissible aliens, who
would, the Court said, “present a very different question.”79 As Justice
Thomas rightly complained in Martinez, if the strong unitary principle was
an accepted feature of federal statutory interpretation jurisprudence, then
“the careful distinction Zadvydas drew between admitted aliens and
nonadmitted aliens was irrelevant at best and misleading at worst.”80
Under the strong unitary principle, the construction given to the phrase
“may be detained beyond the removal period” would necessarily apply to
all of the statutory categories of aliens. The Court’s reservation of the
issue of inadmissible aliens in Zadvydas is clearly inconsistent with the
view that the strong unitary principle was an established principle of
interpretation at the time of that case.
78

Two district courts have in fact subsequently held that states are “persons” within the
meaning of the False Claims Act when sued by the United States acting through its
officials. United States ex rel. Chittister v. Department of Community and Economic
Development, No. 1:CV-99-2057 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2002); United States v. University
Hosp. at Stony Brook, 2001 WL 1548797 (E.D.N.Y 2001). At the district court level,
therefore, the False Claims Act provides an example of express polymorphism.
79

533 U.S. at 682.

80

125 S. Ct. at 731 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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b. Express Polymorphism: the Medicare Act
Vermont Agency exhibits polymorphism, but only implied
polymorphism, and only in a Justice’s separate opinion. Of course what
the reader really wants to see is express polymorphism in an actual
Supreme Court opinion. The Medicare Act provides an example.
The critical issue concerns how parties may seek judicial review of
Medicare benefits. The Medicare Act provides a comprehensive scheme
under which benefits are paid and under which recipients may seek review
of benefits decisions. The Act attempts to channel all challenges to
Medicare decisions into this special process, which requires a claimant
first to present a claim for benefits and then, if dissatisfied, to seek judicial
review of the administrative ruling on the claim.81 The Act attempts to
block any other suits, such as suits under the general federal question
jurisdiction, by providing in section 405(h):
No action against the United States . . . or any officer or
employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or
1346 of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this
subchapter.82
In a series of cases familiar to administrative law scholars, the
Supreme Court has attempted to clarify just how far § 405(h)’s
jurisdictional preclusion goes.83 In particular, the Court has struggled to
understand whether the prohibition on using § 1331 jurisdiction to recover
on “any claim arising under this subchapter” covers only challenges to
particularized benefits decisions or whether it also bars a challenge to a
general Medicare regulation. The Court gave the phrase the narrower
reading in Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians.84 That case
concerned a statutory and constitutional challenge to a Medicare
regulation applicable to Part B of the Medicare program, which is an
optional health care plan that supplements the automatic coverage

81

42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

82

42 U.S.C. § 405(h). This provision is actually a part of the Social Security Act, which
sets up a similar scheme for judicial review of Social Security benefits decisions. The
Medicare Act provides that section 405 applies to the Medicare Act “to the same extent
as” it applies to the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii.
83

In addition to the cases discussed in the text below, see Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S.
602 (1984); United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201 (1982); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422
U.S. 749 (1975).
84

475 U.S. 667.
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provided by Part A.85 The Court observed that, under the statutory
provisions governing Part B, if parties dissatisfied with the method for
calculating benefits could not challenge the regulation in an ordinary §
1331 action, they would have no forum in which to challenge the
regulation.86 The Court noted that such a construction of § 405(h) would
violate the presumption of judicial review and would give rise to a
“serious constitutional question” in that it would bar consideration of
constitutional challenges to the methods for calculating benefits under Part
B.87 The Court avoided this question by construing § 405(h) not to bar
challenges to the validity of Medicare regulations.88
The Court reached a different result, however, when Section 405(h)
came before it again in Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care,
Inc.89 Once again, the case concerned a general challenge to the Medicare
regulations, this time under Part A. This time, however, the Court
determined that § 405(h) barred the challenge. The language of § 405(h),
the Court observed, made no distinction between fact-specific challenges
to particular benefits decisions and legal challenges to regulations.90
Moreover, the Court noted, the case did not present a situation in which
holding Medicare’s specialized review provisions to be exclusive would
deprive the plaintiffs of any forum in which to seek review.91
The result of these cases is this: a challenge to a Medicare regulation
may or may not constitute a “claim arising under” the Medicare program
within the meaning of § 405(h), depending on whether or not the
application of the § 405(h) bar would create a situation in which there
would be no forum in which the challenge could receive any review. The
Court chose to limit the application of the constitutional avoidance
principle to cases in which the constitutional concern actually exists, even
though doing so required treating the phrase “claim arising under this
subchapter” as a polymorphic operator.92
85

Id. at 668, 674-75.
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476 U.S. at 679-81.

87

476 U.S. at 681 n.12.
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Id. at 680. Congress subsequently amended the Act to provide for more judicial review
under Part B. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff.
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529 U.S. 1 (2000).

90

Id. at 13-14.
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529 U.S. at 17-20.
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The dissenters called attention to this point. Justice Scalia argued that there was no
“basis for holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii has a different meaning with regard to Part A
than with regard to Part B.” 529 U.S. at 32 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas
claimed that the Court had confused the constitutional avoidance motivation of Michigan
Academy with the case’s holding that § 405(h) did not bar challenges to Medicare
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c. Tacit Polymorphism: the National Labor Relations Act
A final example of constitutional avoidance polymorphism illustrates
the phenomenon of “tacit polymorphism.” This phenomenon occurs when
a court, in effect, applies the polymorphic principle to statutory text, but
does so without expressly interpreting any particular statutory text.
National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago93
presented the questions of whether the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) covers the employment relationship between a religious school
and its teachers, and whether, if so, the Act is constitutional.94 The
Supreme Court avoided the second question by applying the constitutional
avoidance principle to the first. Rather than “resolve difficult and
sensitive questions arising out of the guarantees of the First Amendment
Religion Clauses,”95 the Court determined that the statute did not cover
teachers at religious schools.
But what about other employees at religious schools? The Court’s
opinion, which focused heavily on the “unique role of the teacher in
fulfilling the mission of a church-operated school,”96 seemed to leave open
the possibility that the NLRA might cover a religious school’s other
employees.
A subsequent Ninth Circuit opinion, National Labor
Relations Board v. Hanna Boys Center,97 held that the NLRA does indeed
require religious schools to bargain collectively with employees such as
child-care workers, cooks, and maintenance workers.98
The different outcomes of Catholic Bishop and Hanna Boys Center
could make perfect sense as applications of the Free Exercise Clause, but
both of these cases purport to be interpreting the NLRA, not the
Constitution.99 As a matter of statutory interpretation, these cases appear
to involve the polymorphic principle. Religious schools, the courts appear
to be saying, are sometimes “employers” subject to the NLRA and
sometimes not.
regulations. Id. at 39 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
93

440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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Id. at 491.
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440 U.S. at 507.
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Id. at 501.
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940 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Id. at 1302-03.
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See Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 504 (“We therefore turn to an examination of the
National Labor Relations Act to decide whether it must be read to confer jurisdiction . .
.”); Hanna Boys Center, 940 F.2d at 1302 (“We are not constrained, . . . as the Supreme
Court was in Catholic Bishop, to construe the NLRA more narrowly than its plain
language invites.”).
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The polymorphism is, however, tacit. In Catholic Bishop, the
Supreme Court, possibly to avoid acknowledging the degree to which it
was glossing statutory language, or possibly just because of the loose
interpretive practices of the era,100 made no reference to any particular
statutory text.101 Hanna Boys Center, similarly, quoted no statutory
language.102 The courts’ failure to discuss the statutory text at all
concealed their need to treat the NLRA’s terms as polymorphic operators
in order to avoid First Amendment questions. There is not a hint of an
exemption for religious schools in the NLRA’s text, and certainly no hint
of a partial exemption. In effect, the courts created a partial exemption by
holding that church-operated schools sometimes are, and sometimes are
not, “employers” within the meaning of the Act.103 When a court simply
superimposes a constitutional overlay onto statutory text without
considering the interpretive problems involved, and the result is
effectively to impose multiple meanings on statutory terms, the court may
be said to engage in “tacit” polymorphism.104
2. “Subconstitutional” Polymorphism
A second motivation for application of the polymorphic principle
occurs when, even though a statute, under any possible interpretation,
would be perfectly constitutional, the statute nonetheless treads in an area
where constitutional concerns have given rise to a special rule of statutory
100

The 1970s, in retrospect, appear as a period in which the Supreme Court was
particularly apt to follow the sarcastic interpretive maxim that when the legislative
history is ambiguous, it is permitted to consider the statutory text. Cf. Scalia, supra note
5, at 31.

101

After saying that it would “turn to an examination of the National Labor Relations
Act,” 440 U.S. at 504, the Court in fact said only this: “Admittedly, Congress defined the
Board’s jurisdiction in very broad terms; we must therefore examine the legislative
history of the Act to determine whether Congress contemplate that the grant of
jurisdiction would include teachers in [church-operated] schools.” Id.
102

940 F.2d at 1300-02.
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Cf. 440 U.S. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the Court’s ruling as creating
“one more exception” to the statutory definition of “employer”).
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It might be possible to avoid polymorphism by characterizing the holding of Catholic
Bishop as an interpretation of the term “employee” in the NLRA, rather than “employer,”
if the reading were, “an employee other than a teacher at a religious school.” The
problem, however, is that a sufficiently nuanced interpretation could always make it
appear that a court or judge is following the unitary principle—Justice Ginsburg’s
opinion in Vermont Agency, for example, could be explained by imagining that she
regards the term “person” in the False Claims Act as meaning “a person other than a state
entity being sued by a qui tam relator.” The essence of the unitary principle, however, is
that a statutory term should receive a single construction that is not dependent on factual
changes that implicate other statutory terms.

- 23 -

interpretation, such as a “clear statement” rule. Such a special interpretive
rule may apply to one application of a statutory provision but not others.
In such cases, courts face the question of whether, as the Court put it in
Martinez, “[t]he lowest common denominator . . . must govern.”105
The answer is—not always. For example, Library of Congress v.
Shaw106 concerned the question of whether a court may award interest on
attorney’s fees awarded to a federal employee under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.107 The Act’s fee-shifting provision provides that a
court may allow a prevailing party (other than the United States), “a
reasonable attorney’s fee” and provides for the United States to be liable
“the same as a private person.”108 Even though the provision for a
“reasonable attorney’s fee” allows a court to award interest on attorney’s
fees against a private defendant,109 the Court determined that this same
phrase does not provide for interest on attorney’s fees against the United
States.
This polymorphic interpretation stemmed from the special,
subconstitutional interpretive rules applicable to waivers of sovereign
immunity. It would not be unconstitutional for Congress to allow courts
to award interest against the United States, because Congress may waive
the federal government’s sovereign immunity. Nonetheless, the issue of
sovereign immunity gives rise to special concerns. Because waiver of
sovereign immunity is a legislative prerogative,110 courts endeavor to
avoid creating any waiver not approved by Congress, by applying the
interpretive principle that waivers of federal sovereign immunity must be
strictly construed.111 Moreover, awards of interest against the federal
government are particularly disfavored. Such awards are subject to the
“no-interest rule,” a further interpretive principle that is even more
stringent than the already strict principle of construction generally
applicable to waivers of federal sovereign immunity.112
In light of this stringent interpretive principle, the Court determined in
Shaw that it could not interpret Title VII’s allowance of a “reasonable”
105

125 S. Ct. at 724.
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478 U.S. 310 (1986).
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As amended in 1972, Title VII provides federal employees as well as private
employees with protection against employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16.
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5 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
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478 U.S. at 313.
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E.g., Schillinger v. U.S., 155 U.S. 163, 166 (1894).
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E.g., Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996).
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Shaw, 478 U.S. at 318 (“The no-interest rule provides an added gloss of strictness”
upon the usual rules for interpreting waivers of sovereign immunity).
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attorney’s fee as providing for interest.113 In so holding, the Court treated
the phrase “reasonable attorney’s fee” polymorphically. The phrase
allowed for interest on attorney’s fees awarded against private parties,114
but not against the United States.
Interestingly, the Court, only three years earlier, had specifically noted
that the unitary principle may require narrow construction of a fee-shifting
provision that applies to both private parties and the United States. In
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club,115 in considering the fee-shifting provision of
the Clean Air Act, the Court noted that the provision “affects fee awards
against the United States, as well as against private individuals”116 and
held that it therefore “must be construed strictly in favor of the
sovereign.”117 Shaw, however, demonstrates that the unitary principle
applied in Sierra Club is the weak unitary principle. The Court may apply
the polymorphic principle in appropriate cases. Shaw is an example of
express subconstitutional polymorphism.118
Another very clear example of express subconstitutional
polymorphism arises from the well-known civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. §
1983. This statute provides that “[e]very person” who, under color of state
law, violates someone’s federal rights, “shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
113

Id. at 320.

114

Id. at 313.

115

463 U.S. 680 (1983).

116

Id. at 685.
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Id. at 685-86 (internal quotations omitted).
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Scholarly fairness requires me to note that the claim that Library of Congress v. Shaw
applies the polymorphic principle is not quite perfect, because the Court did not have
occasion to hold that Title VII allows for interest on fee awards against private parties. It
is conceivable that the Court meant to leave that question open, and in a later case it
could have applied the unitary principle to determine that Title VII must be understood to
deny interest on all fee awards. Still, the evidence to the contrary is sufficiently strong to
justify including Shaw in the catalogue of cases applying the polymorphic principle.
Although the Court does not hold that Title VII permits interest on fee awards against
private parties, it does state that “[t]he Court of Appeals noted that in a Title VII suit
against a private employer, interest on attorney’s fees may be recovered.” 478 U.S. at
313. This sentence seems approving. There is no suggestion of the subjunctive; it does
not appear that the Court reserves the issue or assumes it only arguendo. The Court
supports the statement with citation to an actual lower court holding. Id. Moreover, after
Shaw, as before, lower courts and commentators continued to hold or state that Title VII
permitted interest on attorney’s fees in cases against private defendants. In re Burlington
Northern, Inc. Employment Practices Litigation, 810 F.2d 601, 609 (7th Cir. 1986);
CHARLES R. RICHEY, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND CIVIL
RIGHTS ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1988). Thus, lower courts and commentators
understood Shaw to have treated the phrase “reasonable attorney’s fees” polymorphically.
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redress.”119 In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,120 the
Supreme Court determined that a state officer acting in an official capacity
both is and is not a “person” within the meaning of this statute. In light of
the principle that Congress must act clearly when it desires to “alter the
usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal
Government,”121 the Court held that a state official acting in an official
capacity is not a “person” within the meaning of section 1983 when sued
for damages.122 In a footnote, however, the Court observed that “of
course” such an official “when sued for injunctive relief, would be a
person under § 1983.”123 Thus, a state officer sued officially is not a
person in connection with § 1983’s provision for an “action at law” but is
a person in connection with the provision for a “suit in equity.”124
3. Policy Polymorphism
Sometimes, the motivation for application of the polymorphic
principle appears to arise simply from the court’s perception that the result
of applying the unitary principle will be undesirable as a policy matter. In
such cases, courts construe statutory text in such different ways as is
necessary under different circumstances so as to achieve desirable results.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, mentioned above in connection
with the Bossier Parish case,125 provides a good example. As noted
earlier, section 5 permits judicial preclearance of a proposed change in
voting procedures provided the change “does not have the purpose and
119

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).

120

491 U.S. 58 (1989).

121

491 U.S. at 65 (internal quotation omitted).

122

Id. at 71.

123

Id. at 71 n.10 (emphasis added).
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Subconstitutional polymorphism also occurs in implied form in connection with the
application of the rule of lenity to “mixed” statutes that impose civil and criminal liability
on the same conduct. In the well-known case of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S.
726 (1978) (the “seven dirty words” case), for example, the Supreme Court had to
construe the statutory prohibition of “indecent” radio broadcasts. This prohibition is
contained in a criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1464, but the Communications Act also
authorizes the FCC to revoke the license of or to impose a civil penalty upon a station
that violates the prohibition. 47 U.S.C. §§ 312, 503. In construing the meaning of
“indecent,” the Court remarked that “the validity of the civil sanctions is not linked to the
validity of the criminal penalty. . . . [W]e need not consider any questions relating to the
possible application of § 1464 as a criminal statute.” 438 U.S. at 739 n.13. As the
dissent pointed out, this reasoning was inconsistent with the strong unitary principle. Id.
at 780 n.8 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The Court’s refusal to consider the potential
application of the statute in criminal cases constitutes an implied polymorphism.
125

See supra Part I.A.
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will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color.”126 Bossier Parish applied the unitary principle
to conclude that the phrase “denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color” should have the same meaning whether it is
triggered by the “purpose” or “effect” prong of section 5.127
As Bossier Parish acknowledged, however, an earlier case, City of
Richmond v. United States,128 took a polymorphic approach to section 5.
Richmond concerned a city’s annexation of additional land. The
annexation lowered the percentage of African-Americans in the city from
52% to 42%. The Court held that the annexation did not have the
forbidden effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race. Almost every annexation, the Court observed, causes some change
in a city’s racial composition.129 So long as the postannexation voting
system provides for fair representation of racial minorities, the Court held,
an annexation does not have the “effect” forbidden by section 5.130
Nonetheless, the Court held that section 5 imposed the further
requirement that an annexation be supported by a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory purpose.131 If the only purpose of an annexation were
to reduce the percentage of a racial minority group in a city’s population,
the Court held, the annexation would violate section 5. The Court was
quite aware that its holding meant that section 5 would have different
meanings with regard to its “purpose” prong and its “effect” prong. The
Court pointedly observed that:
[I]t may be asked how it could be forbidden by § 5 to have
the purpose and intent of achieving only what is a perfectly
legal result under that section.132
The Court answered its own question on policy grounds:
The answer is plain, and we need not labor it. An official
action, whether an annexation or otherwise, taken for the
purpose of discriminating against Negroes on account of
their race has no legitimacy at all under our Constitution or
126

5 U.S.C. § 1973c; see Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000).

127

See supra Part I.A.

128

422 U.S. 358 (1975).

129

422 U.S. at 368.

130

Id. at 371.

131

Id. at 375.

132

422 U.S. at 373.
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under the statute. . . . An annexation proved to be of this
kind and not proved to have a justifiable basis is forbidden
by § 5, whatever its actual effect may have been or may
be.133
Richmond provides an example of express policy polymorphism. The
words “denying or abridging the right to vote” have one meaning with
regard to effects and a different meaning with regard to purpose.134
Indeed, in Bossier Parish the Court itself “acknowledged that Richmond
created a discontinuity between the effect and purpose prongs of § 5.”135
Thus, section 5 provides not only an example of express polymorphism,
but an expressly judicially acknowledged example.136

133

422 U.S. at 378-79.

134

The Court adhered to this polymorphic interpretation a decade later in City of Pleasant
Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987). In that case, it was particularly clear that
the city’s proposed annexation could not have a retrogressive effect on the voting rights
of racial minority groups, because the city, prior to the annexation, had no minority
voters. Id. at 465, 470-71. Nonetheless, the Court held that the annexation could not be
precleared under section 5 because the city had not demonstrated that the annexation
lacked the purpose of diluting minority voting strength. Id. at 472.
135

528 U.S. at 330.

136

Another excellent example of policy polymorphism (at the lower court level) comes
from the patent statute. The Patent Act requires that a patent issue only to an invention
that is new, useful, and not obvious. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103. The requirement that
the invention be “new” is embodied in a complex set of rules in § 102, which have
received remarkable and sometimes tortured interpretations. See ROGER E. SCHECHTER
& JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 323 (2003) (“the statute cannot be read in
isolation from the array of judicial precedent that has interpreted nearly each of its
words”). Among these interpretations, at least one is polymorphic: the interpretation of
the requirement, in § 102(b), that a patent may not issue if the claimed invention was in
“public use” for more than a year prior to the patent application date. Metallizing
Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946),
presented the question of whether this provision bars a patent for a manufacturing process
if the patent applicant used the process in secret but sold the product of the process before
the critical date. Speaking through Learned Hand, the court said yes, and it justified its
opinion on the policy ground that a patentee should not be allowed to extend the term of
the patent monopoly by secretly practicing the process in a way that gives a competitive
advantage. Id. at 520. But in the later case of W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock,
Inc., 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court held that if someone other than the patent
applicant is doing exactly the same thing (i.e., using the process secretly and selling the
product), that does not constitute a “public use” within the meaning of § 102(b), because
“[a]s between a prior inventor who benefits from a process by selling its product but . . .
keeps the process from the public, and a later inventor who promptly files a patent
application . . ., the law favors the latter.” Id. at 1550. Thus, secretly practicing a process
and selling the output both is and is not a “public use” of the process within the meaning
of § 102(b), depending on who does it.
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4. “Stare Decisis” Polymorphism
One last motivation for use of the polymorphic principle arises when a
court disagrees with a prior case interpreting a statute, but desires to
adhere to the case as a matter of precedent. The doctrine of stare decisis
operates with particular force in statutory interpretation because the
legislature can always correct what it perceives to be erroneous
interpretations of its statutes.137 However, a court might desire to avoid
having a prior error control a statute’s further applications. Confining the
effect of prior errors may be possible only through application of the
polymorphic principle.
Once again, section 5 of the Voting Rights Act provides an example.
When the Court, in Bossier Parish, applied the unitary principle to
conclude that section 5’s prohibition on judicial preclearance of voting
changes “denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color” has the same meaning with regard to both a change’s “effect” and
its “purpose,”138 four Justices dissented. Justice Souter’s opinion, joined
by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, expressed disagreement with
the prior holding, in Beer v. United States, that a voting change that
diluted minority votes had an “effect” forbidden by section 5 only if the
change was retrogressive.139 Because Justice Souter “adhere[d] to the
strong policy of respecting precedent in statutory interpretation,” he stated
that he would not reexamine Beer itself.140 He also, however, stated that
“that policy does not demand that recognized error be compounded
indefinitely.”141 He therefore advocated “[g]iving wider scope to purpose
than to effect under § 5.”142 Though only a minority opinion, Justice
Souter’s opinion provides a clear example of express stare decisis
polymorphism.
5. Polymorphism in Constitutional Interpretation
Finally, although this Article is primarily concerned with the
polymorphic principle in statutory interpretation, it is worth noting that the
Supreme Court has also applied the polymorphic principle when
interpreting the Constitution. The Commerce Clause provides that
Congress shall have power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,

137

Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 317, 317 (2005).
138

Bossier Parish, 528 U.S. at 329.

139

528 U.S. at 342 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

140

Id.

141

Id.

142

Id. at 368.
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and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”143 The words
“regulate Commerce” appear but once, yet the Supreme Court has
interpreted the commerce power differently as it applies to foreign
commerce, interstate commerce, and commerce with the Indian Tribes.144
This appears to be a policy polymorphism.
*

*

*

*

*

In sum, numerous cases—far more than could be dismissed as mere
errors, outliers, or aberrations—refute the Supreme Court’s claim that the
polymorphic principle is “novel.”145 Although the courts, in accordance
with the weak unitary principle, presume that a single phrase in a single
statutory provision has a single meaning, this presumption is defeasible.
In appropriate cases, the Supreme Court, lower courts, and individual
judges and Justices have all applied the polymorphic principle, expressly,
impliedly, and tacitly. The examples given above make clear the
motivation for use of the polymorphic principle: it comes into play when
some special motivation—based perhaps in the Constitution, in
subconstitutional principles, or in pure policy—requires a special
construction of one application of a statute, and the court desires to
prevent that special motivation from spilling over into all applications.
While the polymorphic principle applies only infrequently, it is established
in the cases of the federal courts at all levels.
III.

THE POLYMORPHIC PRINCIPLE AND THE JUDICIAL
ROLE

So much, then, for the Supreme Court’s claim that the polymorphic
principle is “novel.” But what about the claim that it is “dangerous”? The
previous section demonstrated, as a purely descriptive matter, that courts,
including the Supreme Court, have (until Martinez) considered themselves
free to give a single statutory phrase multiple meanings in appropriate, if
rare, cases. It remains to consider the polymorphic principle as a
normative matter and to decide whether it should play a role in statutory
interpretation.
Doing so requires consideration of issues both of practicality and
143

U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.

144

See, e.g., Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers , Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 434 (1932)
(“the power when exercised in respect of foreign commerce may be broader than when
exercised as to interstate commerce”). For a full analysis of this polymorphism, see
Prakash, supra note 6, at 1165-72.
145

Clark v. Martinez, 125 S. Ct. at 725
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theory. The choice between the polymorphic principle and the strong
unitary principle, like so many issues of statutory interpretation, implicates
the most general questions regarding the proper judicial role. As this Part
shows, the Court’s decision to stake out a claim for the strong unitary
principle is inextricably tied to Justice Scalia’s sustained campaign to limit
the judicial role in statutory interpretation.
The choice for the
polymorphic principle ultimately rests on an understanding of the error in
Justice Scalia’s position.
This Part first examines whether the strong unitary principle makes
sense either as a purely linguistic matter or as a matter of the general
principles applicable to the canons of statutory construction. After
concluding that both of these approaches in fact support the polymorphic
principle, this Part turns to the heart of the likely reason for Justice
Scalia’s embrace of the strong unitary principle: his view that the
principle is demanded by the separation of powers. This Part attempts to
demonstrate that the judicial role properly encompasses the degree of
judicial choice required by the polymorphic principle.
A. A Pure Linguistic Approach
The strong unitary principle tacitly assumes that it is simply
impossible for a single term or phrase in a single statutory provision to
have multiple meanings in different circumstances.146 However, as a
purely linguistic matter, it is possible, though admittedly uncommon, for a
single term in a single sentence to have multiple meanings. In the
sentence, “I ran ten miles on Monday and a marathon on Thursday,” the
word “ran” has the same meaning with regard to both the ten-mile run and
the marathon, but in the sentence, “I ran ten miles on Monday and the
Marathon Oil Company on Thursday,” the word evidently means one
thing with regard to the ten miles and something quite different with
regard to Marathon. A similar effect is apparent in the famous riposte of
John Wilkes, who, upon being told by the Earl of Sandwich that he would
die either on the gallows or of the pox, replied, “that depends, my Lord,
upon whether I embrace your principles, or your mistress.”147 Evidently
the single word “embrace” bears two different senses in this sentence.148
This kind of double entendre is not only uncommon but is usually, as
146

Cf. Martinez, 125 S. Ct. at 723 (“the statute can be construed ‘literally’ to authorize
indefinite detention . . . or . . . it can be read to ‘suggest [less than] unlimited discretion’
to detain . . . . It cannot, however, be interpreted to do both at the same time.”).
147

See JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 368 (15th ed. 1980) (giving the quotation
in slightly different form). This quotation is often attributed to Benjamin Disraeli (who is
said to have given it in reply to William Gladstone), but I take Bartlett as the reliable
arbiter of these matters.
148

For other examples, see Prakash, supra note 6, at 1157-58.
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these examples show, an attempt at humor (Wilkes’s attempt being rather
more successful than my own). Humor is not a quality one typically
associates with statutes, so it seems appropriate to assume, as a general
matter, that a legislature has not created statutory double entendres.149 But
it is not linguistically impossible for a single term in a single sentence to
bear multiple meanings. One must look to something other than the rules
of the English language to find a principle that a single term in a single
statutory provision must always bear a single meaning.
B. A Canonical Approach
The strong unitary principle also finds little support in the general
practices associated with canons of statutory interpretation. Indeed, the
general practices cut strongly against it. The Supreme Court has
confirmed countless times that “canons of construction are no more than
rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation.”150
The canons create presumptions, but they are defeasible presumptions.
The strong unitary principle is strangely—and unwisely—different.
Consider, for example, the closely related canon that courts will
presume that a word or phrase used multiple times within a single statute
has the same meaning each time. The Supreme Court has stated this
canon innumerable times.151 Yet in ordinary speech the same word may
certainly bear different meanings when used twice, even within a single
sentence (“We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang
separately”),152 and in statutory interpretation the Court has always
recognized that the canon is only one guide to statutory meaning that other
indications may overcome, even when the multiple uses of a single term
are statutorily proximate and exactly parallel.

149

See id. at 1158 (noting that one does not expect to find double entendres in the
Constitution).
150

Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992).
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E.g., National Aeronautics and Space Admin. v. Federal Labor Relations Authority,
527 U.S. 229, 235 (1999); Commissioner v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 250 (1996); Gustafson
v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995); Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118
(1994); Department of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Industries, Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 342,
(1994); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994); Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos
Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 479 (1992); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990);
Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986); Erlenbaugh v. United
States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S.
427, 433 (1932).

152

BARTLETT, supra note 147, at 348 (quoting Benjamin Franklin). Between Wilkes and
Franklin, we can see that politicians, who, after all, are responsible for legislation, are
particularly adept at bringing out the multiple meanings that words may have.
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For example, in Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States,153 the
Supreme Court considered the application of section 3 of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act. Section 1 of the Act declares illegal:
[e]very contract, combination, . . . or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or
with foreign nations[.]154
Section 3 declares illegal:
[e]very contract, combination, . . . or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the
United States or of the District of Columbia[.]155
The two sections are exactly parallel and the words “trade or commerce”
appear in them identically, so there would seem to be a particularly strong
case for expecting the words to have the same meaning in each section.
That was precisely the point made by the Atlantic Cleaners
defendants, who were alleged to have violated section 3 by restraining
trade or commerce in the District of Columbia. They asserted that section
1 of the Act was necessarily limited by the scope of Congress’s power
under the Commerce Clause, and that their conduct, which involved only
the provision of services, not trade in goods, was beyond the scope of the
commerce power and therefore could not have constituted “trade or
commerce” within the meaning of section 1. Because section 3 uses
exactly the same words, the defendants asserted that their conduct could
not constitute “trade or commerce” within the meaning of section 3 either.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. Although acknowledging
that the two sections used the same words and that “[u]ndoubtedly, there is
a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the
same act are intended to have the same meaning,”156 the Court also noted
that “the presumption is not rigid.”157 The Court observed that, whereas
Congress’s power over interstate and foreign commerce is limited by the
Commerce Clause, Congress has plenary power over all matters, including
commerce, in the District of Columbia. Therefore, the Court was “free to
interpret section 3 dissociated from section 1 as though it were a separate

153

286 U.S. 427 (1932).

154

15 U.S.C. § 1.

155

15 U.S.C. § 3.

156

286 U.S. at 433.

157

Id.
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and independent act” and to hold the defendants liable under section 3,
even assuming arguendo that their conduct could not violate section 1.158
(The case thus provided a differentiation between the meanings of the one
term in the two sections that was akin to “constitutional avoidance”
polymorphism as described above.159) Many subsequent opinions have
confirmed that identical words in different sections of the same act may
have different meanings in appropriate circumstances.160
Atlantic Cleaners demonstrates the important principle that the canons
of statutory construction should be a court’s servant, not its master. The
reason is clear:
the canons are general, but judicial action is
particularized. The general advice embodied in the canons, which are
designed to cover the entire range of possible statutes, cannot anticipate
every possible circumstance in which the canons might come into play.
To reach sound results, courts must be free to determine, in appropriate
cases, that a particular statute does not conform to the general canons.161
The strong unitary principle violates this rule by tying a court’s hands.
Moreover, given the defeasible nature of the other canons, the strong
unitary principle introduces a strange discontinuity to the law of statutory
construction. It places dispositive weight on what would appear to be
purely arbitrary congressional drafting choices. For example, at the time
Congress passed the Sherman Act, it might have drafted it just a little
differently: it might have combined sections 1 and 3 to produce a single
section that declared illegal “every contract, combination, or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, with foreign
nations, in any Territory of the United States, or in the District of
Columbia.” Surely a Member of Congress would have expected it to
make no difference whether one statutory section prohibited restraint of all
four categories of trade or commerce, whether the first two categories
appeared in one section and the other two in a separate but exactly parallel
section, or whether each category had its own section. This seems a
purely arbitrary choice, and it would be a strange jurisprudence that would
allow courts to exercise sound judgment in deciding whether to
differentiate the meaning of identical words appearing in two different
sections but absolutely forbid such judgment when words appear in one
158

286 U.S. at 435.
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See supra Part II.B.1.
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E.g., General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 595-96 (2004),
and cases cited therein.

161

Cf. Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1101-03 (concluding, after analysis of early practice,
that “application of the various textualist canons of statutory construction is anything but
mechanical” and that canons “ought not be applied without consideration of statutory
goals and purposes, as well as other legal values”).
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section but have two different applications. Judicial discretion in the
former case is universally accepted and should apply equally to the
latter.162
C. The Separation of Powers Approach
Given that the polymorphic principle is possible linguistically, makes
sense pragmatically, and treats the unitary principle the same as other
canons of statutory construction instead of giving it a unique and
problematic character, why did the Supreme Court reject it in Martinez?
Why would the Court so determinedly handcuff itself to a canon? In
seeking the answer to this question we find the true heart of the debate
between the polymorphic principle and the strong unitary principle.
The answer is intimately tied up with the identity of the author of the
Martinez opinion: Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia is engaged in a sustained
campaign to limit judicial choice. He sees limiting judicial choice as a
necessary aspect of the separation of powers. For him, the polymorphic
principle represents not merely an inferior method of construing statutory
text but a violation of the limited judicial role in our system of
government.
This section addresses the polymorphic principle from a separation of
powers perspective. After first explaining Justice Scalia’s perspective,
this section explains its error. First, it is a mistake to believe that the
judicial role cannot involve the kind of choice that the polymorphic
principle requires courts to make; second, in any event, that degree of
judicial choice is inevitable and efforts to restrict it must ultimately prove
illusory; and third, ironically, the strong unitary principle has the effect of
magnifying the role of judicial choice in statutory interpretation.
1. Justice Scalia and Judicial Choice
Justice Scalia is the Supreme Court’s most persistent and doctrinaire
thinker with regard to matters of statutory interpretation. Though he is
most prominently identified with his long campaign against the use of
legislative history,163 this effort is but a part of his larger campaign against
judicial choice. Justice Scalia consistently argues for limiting the judicial
162

Cf. Vermeule, supra note 6, at 1180. Vermeule makes a similar observation about the
Constitution’s Commerce Clause: the Framers might have drafted it just a little
differently, and provided three Commerce Clauses instead of one Commerce Clause with
three subclauses, without, in all likelihood, thinking that they were making a crucial
decision about the clause’s meaning. Yet under the strong unitary principle, “slight
variations in organizational structure have substantial effects on meaning.” Id.
163

Justice Scalia has long argued against the use of legislative history in statutory
interpretation, and he has carried his campaign to the point of refusing to join any portion
of an opinion that relies on legislative history, even if he joins the rest of the opinion.
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role in our system of government.
Justice Scalia has criticized the adulation given to the “great judge” of
the common-law era as inappropriate for a modern, democratic society in
which most law is statutory.164 Judges, he argues, should not approach
statutes with the “Mr. Fix-it mentality” of the common law judge, whose
goal is to determine the most desirable outcome of a particular case and to
evade any impediments to its achievement.165 Judges must recognize that
their lack of political accountability makes any lawmaking by them at best
uncomfortable in a democracy, and they must avoid the “usurpation” that
would follow from approaching statutes with a common-law judge’s
mentality.166
Most of Justice Scalia’s specific prescriptions with regard to statutory
interpretation, although often supported by numerous different arguments,
find their roots in this core notion of limiting judicial choice. Justice
Scalia supports textualism as the prime method of statutory interpretation;
he argues that courts are bound by the text of statutes rather than by
legislative intent in part because “under the guise or even the self-delusion
of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common-law judges will in
fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending their lawmaking
proclivities.”167 He campaigns against the use of legislative history in part
because it permits too much “manipulability” for the “willful judge,” and
“facilitate[s] rather than deter[s] decisions that are based upon the courts’
policy preferences, rather than neutral principles of law.”168 Justice Scalia
questions the use of some interpretive canons and presumptions, because
he questions whether courts have the authority to choose to “interpret the
laws that Congress passes to mean less or more than what they fairly
say.”169 All of these interpretive proclivities seek to limit judicial choice.
The strong unitary principle naturally fits into Justice Scalia’s
campaign. If courts can sometimes give a single statutory phrase multiple
meanings, they must choose when to do so. To Justice Scalia, this
amounts to “invent[ing] a statute rather than interpet[ing] one.170 That is,
he regards the polymorphic principle as “dangerous”171 because it involves
judicial choice.
164

Scalia, supra note 5, at 7-9, 13.
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Id. at 13-14.
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125 S. Ct. at 722-23.
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Justice Scalia’s distaste for judicial choice and his consequent embrace
of textualism follow from the “faithful agent” model of the judicial role.
The “faithful agent” model posits that the judicial role in statutory cases is
solely to act as the faithful agent of the legislature, not to make policy
choices of its own.172 This model is said to be justified by (perhaps
mandated by) our constitutional structure and particularly by the concept
of separation of powers. The Constitution gives the legislative power to
the politically accountable Congress; politically unaccountable judges
have no business making policy choices of the kind that our Constitution
entrusts to the political branches. By removing one possible mechanism
for the exercise of judicial choice, the strong unitary principle serves the
goal of ensuring that the politically accountable Congress makes the
policy choices in our society.
Of course, the foregoing description may seem like an unfair
caricature of Justice Scalia and of textualism. As Professor Manning
reminds us, even textualists recognize that judges necessarily exercise
some degree of policymaking discretion when construing ambiguous
statutory language.173 The essence of modern textualism, according to
Manning, is not the pretense that statutory language objectively
determines the answer to every question that might come before a court,
but the rejection of the view that a court may disregard clear statutory text
simply because the text departs from a statute’s overall purpose or leads to
a harsh result.174
Still, if there is any caricature involved, it is inherent in the adoption of
the strong unitary principle and in the language of the Martinez opinion.
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See, e.g., Manning, supra note 5, at 5.
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Manning, supra note 11, at 1655; see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[A] certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking,
inheres in most executive or judicial action, and it is up to Congress, by the relative
specificity or generality of its statutory commands, to determine—up to a point—how
small or how large that degree shall be.”).
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Manning, supra note 11, at 1655-57. Professor Manning’s project of making
textualism a workable doctrine of statutory interpretation is admirable (and no one does it
better), but, in my respectful view, it can never succeed except by abandoning
textualism’s central premises—i.e., by turning textualism into something other than
textualism. I have explained this view in other articles, which show that some degree of
the judicial power which Manning says textualism rejects is necessary to explain sound
and generally accepted judicial practices. See Siegel, supra note 5, at 1045-49 (noting
the judicial power to depart, in appropriate circumstances, from clear statutory text that
contradicts strong background principles); Siegel, supra note 11, at 324-35 (noting the
judicial power, in appropriate circumstances, to correct statutory drafting errors). The
recent suggestion of my colleague Jonathan Molot that textualism and other theories of
statutory interpretation have gradually merged, see Jonathan Molot, The Rise and Fall of
Textualism (forthcoming), overlooks, I would respectfully suggest, this central point.
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What, other than a strong distaste for judicial choice, could explain the
conclusion that the unitary principle is not merely a sound general
principle, but an inflexible rule that courts must always follow? Justice
Scalia has gone beyond saying that the courts’ policymaking role must be
limited and interstitial. On this one point, at least, he regards judicial
choice as “dangerous” and wholly forbids it.175
2. Judicial Choice and the “Faithful Agent” Model
The chief difficulty with Justice Scalia’s reasoning is that even the
“faithful agent” model of the judicial role should not bar courts from
making the kind of choices called for by the polymorphic principle. The
constitutional principle of separation of powers unquestionably limits the
judiciary to a far more modest role than that of making the primary policy
choices entrusted to the legislature, but the limits are not so strict as to
wholly eliminate the role of judicial choice, even under the “faithful
agent” model.
Two reasons support this view. The first is textual and historical. The
text of the Constitution does not clearly set forth the judicial role. It does
not specify a method of statutory interpretation nor does it spell out the
judicial role in statutory interpretation. It does not say that courts are to be
faithful agents of the legislature. It simply provides that the federal courts
shall be vested with the “judicial Power.”176
As I and others have argued, this power is best understood in historical
context. The “judicial Power” that the Constitution assigns to the courts
should take at least some of its content from the judicial practices that
would have been familiar to the Framers and ratifiers. An analysis of
those practices shows that, by vesting the courts with the “judicial Power,”
the Framers and ratifiers would have understood that they were entrusting
the courts with some degree of discretion.177 Exactly how much discretion
is an appropriate subject for debate. From the time of the framing down
the present day, however, courts have always exercised some power to
maintain coherence in the law, some power to correct statutory drafting
errors, and, in general, some power to depart from statutory text.178
The great trick, of course, is knowing when departure from statutory
text is appropriate. I have previously agreed that courts certainly do not
have power to depart from statutory text at will, nor on the mere ground
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125 S. Ct. at 727.
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U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
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See Siegel, supra note 5, at 1094-98; Eskridge, supra note 5, passim; GUIDO
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 91-119 (1982).
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See Siegel, supra note 5, at 1094-98; Eskridge, supra note 5, passim; CALABRESI,
supra note 177, at 91-119.
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that particular statutory text leads to a result that appears to conflict with a
statute’s overall purpose.179 In my view, explained in detail elsewhere,
background principles of law play a critical role in determining the
appropriate occasions for exercise of this limited judicial power. Within
any field of law there usually exist background principles that make up a
whole structure of which any one statute forms only a part. Courts should
construe statutes in the context provided by these background principles,
and a startling departure from background principles apparently demanded
by statutory text may be the clue that indicates the appropriateness of a
court’s engaging in something other than purely textualist construction.180
Such judicial action is an essential part of what courts have always done
and therefore forms a part of the “judicial Power” vested in the federal
courts.
The second point is that this view is fully consistent with the “faithful
agent” model. Some scholars reject historical analysis as a guide to the
judicial role.181 The structure of the Constitution, they assert, renders
inapt comparisons to judicial practices in England or in states that did not
have a similar structure of separated powers.182 The separation of powers
within our constitutional structure, the political accountability of
Congress, and judges’ lack of political accountability, demand that courts
act as Congress’s faithful agents.
Accepting this view, however, still does not dictate textualism as a
method of statutory interpretation. The most faithful agent is not the one
who slavishly follows the text of a principal’s written instructions, no
matter what. Even faithful agents recognize the necessity for departure
from such instructions on appropriate occasions.
Again, I have argued this point in detail elsewhere and will give only a
brief summary here. A faithful agent recognizes that some instructions
from the principal are incorrectly worded. This point applies to statutory
interpretation. Even Justice Scalia recognizes a limited judicial power to
correct statutory drafting errors—“scrivener’s errors,” he calls them—that
lead to absurd results, at least when the intended result is obvious.183 A
judge exercising this corrective power is being a faithful agent of
Congress, even though the power is really inconsistent with the textualist
view of statutory interpretation.184
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Siegel, supra note 5, at 1055-56.
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Id. at 1055-57; Siegel, supra note 11, at 348-49.
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Id. at 1662-65.

183

See Siegel, supra note 11, at 325-32.

184

See id. at 333-35.
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Once this power is conceded, it becomes clear that the “faithful agent”
model of the judicial role does not eliminate judicial choice in statutory
interpretation. The faithful agent must exercise a sound discretion in
interpreting the principal’s instructions. Of course one may properly
debate how broad a discretion the agent should exercise. My own view,
which calls upon courts to take background principles of law as an
important guide, gives them more freedom than the strictly textualist
approach, though less than the intentionalist approach.185 The key point,
however, is that it is an error to reject interpretive methods simply because
they involve judicial choice. Such choice may be perfectly consistent with
the faithful agent model.
This analysis of the judicial role matches our intuitive understanding
of what principals really want their faithful agents to do. It would be a
rare principal who truly desired an agent to exercise no judgment in
determining whether to depart from the text of the principal’s instructions.
As Lon Fuller famously remarked, “[t]he stupidest housemaid knows that
. . . when her master tells her to ‘drop everything and come running’ he
has overlooked the possibility that she is at the moment in the act of
rescuing the baby from the rain barrel.”186 Or consider again that most
faithful of agents, the computer. When your Windows machine crashes,
you can be sure that it is faithfully executing the exact instructions given
to it by its programmers. Few users, however, regard this fidelity to the
programmers’ instructions as desirable at the moment it happens. The
crashing computer is more like a unionized employee engaged in a “work
to rule” slowdown—another agent who demonstrates that principals do
not always desire their agents to follow their instructions to the exact
letter.
In any event, it is not really necessary to demonstrate that a faithful
agent may sometimes depart from a principal’s written instructions in
order to justify the degree of judicial choice necessary to implement the
polymorphic principle. The polymorphic principle does not involve
departure from statutory text, but only giving statutory text meanings that
it can bear. It lies within the ordinary realm of construction open to the
faithful agent.
Consider again the Atlantic Cleaners case mentioned above. Purely
linguistic analysis in that case would have strongly suggested that the
phrase “trade or commerce” had the same meaning in sections 1 and 3 of
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Siegel, supra note 11, at 348.
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Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 616, 625
(1949). (Actually Fuller is speaking here through his invented character, Judge Foster.
Id.)
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the Sherman Act, where it appears in exactly parallel constructions.187
The Court, however, properly considered Congress’s purpose in enacting
the statute, which, it determined, included exercising all the power that
Congress possessed, so as to deal with restraint of trade or commerce in
the most comprehensive and effective possible way.188 In light of this
purpose, the Court determined that it was appropriate to construe sections
1 and 3 as though they appeared in two separate statutes, with the latter
construed so as to reflect Congress’s greater power over commerce in the
District of Columbia.189 As noted above, innumerable cases have
confirmed the power of a court to give different meanings to multiple
appearances of a single term in a single statute; no one argues that courts
doing so are violating their duty to act as faithful agents of Congress.
The degree of judicial choice involved in cases of the Atlantic
Cleaners type is no different from that called for by the polymorphic
principle. If a court can treat two sections of the same statute as though
they appear in two separate, purely notional statutes, it should have a like
discretion to treat a single section with two subclauses as though it were
really two separate, notional sections. At no point does this technique
require a court to give statutory text a meaning it will not bear. The
faithful agent, who may uncontroversially recognize that the same text can
bear different meanings when appearing multiple times, can on
appropriate occasions recognize that a single text can bear multiple
meanings even when appearing a single time.
It is an error, therefore, for the Court to attempt to squeeze judicial
choice out of the interpretive process as strongly as it has by endorsing the
strong unitary principle. Even accepting the view that our Constitution
imposes the “faithful agent” model of interpretation upon the courts, that
model permits judicial choice that may, on infrequent but appropriate
occasions, include the choice to depart from statutory text. It certainly
permits the even smaller degree of judicial choice called for by the
polymorphic principle.
3. Eliminating Judicial Choice – Reality and Illusion
Moreover, even if one accepted the view that courts should use an
interpretive methodology that eliminates as much judicial choice as
possible, such a view would still not justify adoption of the strong unitary
principle. The strong unitary principle does not really eliminate judicial
choice. It just creates the illusion of doing so.
Others have argued that Justice Scalia’s textualism, although
187
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purportedly providing an objective, value-neutral methodology that judges
can apply to reach determinate answers, in fact creates only the illusion of
objectivity, while leaving judges ample opportunities for manipulation.190
This point applies to the strong unitary principle. Indeed, the very nature
of the strong unitary principle virtually guarantees that it will be called
into play to mask, not to eliminate, judicial choice.
Any case in which the strong unitary principle makes a real difference
must be a case in which there is a substantial argument for application of
the polymorphic principle. That is, there must be some substantial
argument for why a court should give a single statutory phrase different
meanings under different circumstances. In such a case, even assuming
the court firmly adheres to the strong unitary principle and restricts itself
to choosing one, single meaning for the statutory phrase, that is still a
judicial choice. Necessarily, it is a significant choice. If one possible
meaning for the statutory phrase were simply right and the other simply
wrong, the court would not need the strong unitary principle to tell it what
to do; it would just choose the right meaning anyway.
There is, therefore, no getting away from judicial choice in cases
potentially involving the polymorphic principle. The strong unitary
principle, to be sure, takes away one particular judicial choice. Once a
court interprets the statutory phrase in one case, it is deprived of the power
to give the phrase a different meaning in the next case. To that extent,
choice is reduced. The effect, however, is simply to raise the stakes as to
the initial judicial choice. Justice Scalia’s opinion in Martinez makes this
clear: in giving the statutory phrase its initial interpretation, he explains,
the court “must consider the necessary consequences of its choice.”191
The court must consider how the interpretation will apply in the full range
of possible circumstances, including those not presented by the case
immediately before it,192 and choose one meaning for them all. That is
still a choice, and Justice Scalia provides no convincing explanation for
why one high-stakes judicial choice is better than two judicial choices of
lesser consequence.
Of course, there might be cases in which the contested statutory phrase
has its meaning clearly controlled in one application by a rule of statutory
interpretation. In such cases, perhaps, one could argue that the strong
unitary principle truly eliminates judicial choice, because the meaning in
the one application is objectively fixed and the strong unitary principle
190

This argument is developed in William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown
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then extends that meaning to all applications. But again, if the case is one
in which the strong unitary principle makes a difference, there must be
something about the other applications that creates at least some doubt as
to the clarity of the meaning of the contested statutory phrase, which in
turn suggests that there really was some judicial choice—a high-stakes
choice—involved in the initial interpretation.193
Justice Scalia believes that there is something particularly unworthy
about searching for exceptions to interpretations previously adopted when
those interpretations yield an undesirable result in a later case and
something particularly commendable about sticking to initial decisions in
such cases.194 Certainly one must credit Justice Scalia with respect for his
principles in cases such as Martinez, where it seems clear that he
personally disagreed with the result, which he had previously castigated in
Zadvydas,195 yet voted for it all the same. Making exceptions in later
cases, however, may not reflect unprincipled or arbitrary judging,196 but
rather a sincere attempt to implement the best interpretation of the statute
involved; the undesirable result might serve as an indicator that the correct
implementation of the statute is different in the later case. If we trust
judges to make a principled choice in initially interpreting a statute, it is
not clear why we cannot trust them to make a second principled choice in
a later case and why we must instead raise the stakes on the initial choice.
So the strong unitary principle fails to deliver on its promise of
reducing judicial choice in statutory interpretation. It may limit the
number of times a court must exercise judicial choice, but it
proportionately raises the stakes with regard to those times.
4. The Ratchet Effect of the Strong Unitary Principle
Indeed, for those whose goal is to restrict the role of judicial choice,
the situation is even worse than the previous section suggests. The strong
unitary principle would in many cases have the effect of magnifying the
role of judicial choice in statutory interpretation and of increasing the
degree to which courts depart from the legislative will. It would have this
effect because the strong unitary principle takes the initial judicial choice,
which may be a highly contestable choice that implements judicial
wilfulness at the expense of what the legislative has prescribed, and
compels its application even more broadly than might otherwise be
required.
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Consider, for example, the effect of applying the strong unitary
principle in conjunction with the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. As
Justice Thomas observed in his dissenting opinion in Martinez, the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance takes two forms.197 In one form,
sometimes called the “narrow” or “classical” doctrine of avoidance, it
demands only that when a statute has two potential constructions, one of
which would be constitutional and the other unconstitutional, a court
should give the statute the constitutional construction. In the other
(“broad” or “modern”) form, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance
requires a court to construe a statute so as to avoid even a substantial
doubt as to its constitutionality.198
To the extent that courts invoke the broad doctrine of constitutional
avoidance, they are engaging in judicial choice. As Adrian Vermeule has
observed, the broad doctrine of constitutional avoidance overprotects
constitutional norms.199 It is one thing to say, as the narrow doctrine of
avoidance says, that courts must construe statutes so as to avoid actual
unconstitutionality. To the extent that courts do so, they take nothing
away from legislative power that the Constitution has not already taken;
they merely prevent a statute from having an effect it cannot
constitutionally have. When courts construe a statute so as to avoid
constitutional doubt, however, they impinge on the legislative power. The
principle of legislative supremacy would demand that courts give effect to
duly enacted statutes to the full extent permitted by the Constitution.200
To the extent that courts construe statutes so as to avoid a mere
constitutional doubt, without actually determining that the statute would
be unconstitutional under one possible construction, they fail to give effect
to what might well have been a constitutional exercise of the legislative
power.
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Thus, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance is effectively a judicial
power grab. To be sure, courts invoke the doctrine in the name of
Congress—they claim to believe that Congress desires courts to construe
statutes so as to avoid constitutional issues.201 This attribution of
congressional desire is, however, implausible.202 It would seem more
realistic to presume that Congress wants what it enacted in a statute,
giving that statute its best possible construction (indeed, one might even
regard such a presumption as constitutionally required whether it is
realistic or not).
If, under the best construction, the statute is
unconstitutional, then, of course, Congress cannot get what it wants, but if
the statute, as best construed, only raises a constitutional doubt, and turns
out to be constitutional on close examination, it would seem more realistic
and appropriate to presume that Congress wants the statute enforced. The
doctrine of constitutional avoidance would, therefore, appear to be an
exercise of judicial choice that decreases congressional power.
Moreover, the cases show that the avoidance doctrine can have a very
substantial impact on statutory interpretation. The doctrine is theoretically
limited by the rule that courts will give statutes only “fairly possible”203
constructions and will not “press statutory construction to the point of
disingenuous evasion even to avoid a constitutional question.”204 In fact,
however, courts frequently invoke the rule even when doing so requires
them to give a statute a construction that has no basis whatever in the
statutory language—as, for example, in Zadvydas, when the Supreme
Court determined that the statutory provision that certain aliens “may be
detained beyond the removal period,”205 implicitly limits the Attorney
General’s authority to detain removable aliens.206 The Supreme Court
exercised judicial choice in this case, as is evidenced by the 5-4 split
among the Justices and by the dissent’s complaint about the Court’s
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“obvious disregard of congressional intent.”207 Examples such as this one
show that courts exercise substantial discretion in determining how far to
go in avoiding constitutional issues. The doctrine of constitutional
avoidance is not only an exercise of judicial choice, but it arrogates a
considerable degree of power to the courts.
Now consider how the broad avoidance doctrine interacts with the
strong unitary principle. Once a court gives statutory text a particular
construction in one application in order to avoid constitutional doubt, the
strong unitary principle demands that that construction apply to all
applications of the text, even applications that raise no constitutional
doubt, because the “lowest common denominator” must control.208 The
result is that the strong unitary principle ratchets up the judicial
interference with the congressional will. First, the courts seize power by
construing a statute under the avoidance principle so as to block its
possibly constitutional effect; then, the strong unitary principle multiples
the judicial interference with the congressional enactment by extending
that construction to other applications of the statute that may not even pose
any constitutional problem.
Zadvydas and Martinez provide an excellent illustration of this effect.
First, in Zadvydas, the Court invoked the avoidance doctrine to give the
immigration laws an interpretation that was textually quite implausible,
but judicially preferable, on the ground that there was some doubt as to the
constitutionality of indefinite detention of removable aliens. Justice Scalia
was among those insisting that the Court had “obvious[ly] disregard[ed] . .
. congressional intent.”209 Then, in Martinez, the Court applied the strong
unitary principle to extend that implausible interpretation to the case of
inadmissible aliens, without even claiming that indefinite detention of
such aliens would raise any constitutional doubts.210 Thus, the strong
unitary principle had the effect of extending the violence that the Court
had initially done to the statute into further applications where it might not
have been necessary under the avoidance doctrine alone.
Similar ratchet effects would follow from applying the strong unitary
principle in other situations involving an initial judicial choice. For
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example, in Library of Congress v. Shaw, as noted earlier, the Supreme
Court construed Title VII so as not to provide for interest on attorney’s fee
awards entered against the United States.211 The Court’s opinion was
quite implausible as a matter of statutory construction;212 the Court
reached its result only by applying the countertextual no-interest rule. If
the Court had then followed the strong unitary principle, it would have had
to conclude that interest awards were not available on any attorney’s fees
awarded under Title VII, whether against a private party or the United
States. The initial choice to follow the no-interest rule would have
significantly interfered with the entire scheme of Title VII, by extending a
rule applicable only to the federal government into the much larger sphere
of private employment.213 (In fact, as noted above, the Court applied the
polymorphic principle.)
Thus, not only does the strong unitary principle fail to eliminate
judicial choice, in many cases it would have the perverse effect of
magnifying judicial choice. Once courts make the initial choice to depart
from congressional intent in the name of some other value served by a
judicially developed principle of statutory interpretation, the strong unitary
principle would extend that judicial choice into further statutory
applications, where it might serve neither the congressional intent nor the
other, judicially desired value.
5. Practical Arguments Concerning the Strong Unitary Principle
Two other arguments that one could make—and that Justice Scalia
probably would make—for the strong unitary principle should also be
noted: that clear rules of the kind provided by the principle would reduce
litigation costs and would provide Congress with a clear background
against which to legislate. Justice Scalia has made arguments of this kind
in connection with other principles of statutory interpretation, such as
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avoiding the use of legislative history.214
The short answer to these arguments is that these benefits, assuming
them to exist, have not been thought sufficient, in the case of other canons
of construction, to overcome the benefit of maintaining judicial flexibility
to reach the best construction of a particular statute. As noted earlier,
other canons, including the closely related canon that words appearing
multiple times within a single statute are presumed to have the same
meaning each time, serve as guides, not as inflexible rules. The
“standards v. rules” debate is a long-standing one,215 but, at least with
regard to statutory construction, the usual answer is that general principles
are too general to merit complete adherence in all cases.
The longer answer is that the claimed benefits are also doubtful. As to
litigation costs, it seems unlikely that the strong unitary principle could
become so firmly established that litigants would just give up in cases
where there is some strong reason to apply the polymorphic principle.
Courts rarely adhere to even apparently settled principles of statutory
construction so firmly as to avoid all need for litigation. 216
In any event, the choice of the initial statutory interpretation would
have to be fought out circuit by circuit, until such time as the Supreme
Court steps in, so there would be no saving there. Indeed, the strong
unitary principle might increase litigation costs by increasing the number
of conflicts that the Supreme Court must resolve. If the Court took the
strong unitary principle seriously, then, where a statute says, “if (A or B),
then C,” a case from one circuit giving C a particular meaning in
connection with A would have to be regarded as conflicting with a case
from a different circuit giving C a different meaning in connection with B.
Under current practice, the two cases might be regarded as a mere “false
conflict,” but the strong unitary principle would make the conflict a true
one, putting further strain on the time of the Supreme Court, which is one
of the system’s scarcest resources.
As to the prospect of providing clear rules against which Congress can
legislate, I have previously argued that this apparently commendable goal
is something of a chimera.217 Its achievement requires assuming an
unrealistic degree of perfection in the congressional drafting process. So
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long as we remain human beings, not gods,218 Congress will on occasion
draft statutes that defy the supposedly “clear” rules of construction. That
is why it is best to retain the rules as general guides but not to render them
completely inflexible.
* * * * *
In sum, the strong unitary principle is not only incorrect linguistically
and a poor fit with general practices with regard to the canons of statutory
construction, but it does not follow from the separation of powers or the
“faithful agent” model of the judicial role. Courts can and do exercise the
degree of judicial choice called for by the polymorphic principle.
Moreover, even if one adopted the goal of minimizing judicial choice to
the extent possible, the strong unitary principle would not follow. The
strong unitary principle provides only the illusion of eliminating judicial
choice. Indeed, in many cases, it has the ironic effect of magnifying the
role of judicial choice in the process of statutory construction.
IV. THE POLYMORPHIC FUTURE
It remains to consider the future of the polymorphic principle. This
Part suggests that, notwithstanding Martinez, the polymorphic principle is
probably alive and well. Therefore, this Part attempts to set forth some
guidelines for its use and to consider the role of Congress in regulating it.
A. Polymorphism and Stare Decisis
Whatever one thinks of the propriety or wisdom of the polymorphic
principle, one might imagine that Martinez simply resolves the issue. Has
the Supreme Court firmly rejected the polymorphic principle and rendered
discussion of the matter pointless? Is the issue now determined for future
cases by stare decisis?
Probably not. To be sure, Martinez’s language appears quite stark.
The Court (by a solid, 7-2 majority) declares polymorphism to be a
“dangerous principle.”219 It says that statutory language cannot have two
meanings at the same time.220 It says that where one statutory application
calls for ambiguous language to have a limited meaning, a court cannot
give the same language a broader meaning in a different application;
rather, the “lowest common denominator . . . must control.”221 Thus, the
218
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Court seems to have considered the general interpretive issue thoroughly
and self-consciously and to have set its face against the polymorphic
principle as squarely as it can.
The Supreme Court’s cases, however, strongly suggest that the Court
lacks real methodological commitments in matters of statutory
interpretation. When the Court decides a statutory interpretation case,
stare decisis effect attaches to the interpretation that the Court gives to a
statute, but the Court does not adhere to the interpretive methods used to
reach that interpretation. Time and again one sees the Court stating a
principle of statutory interpretation without apparent qualification in one
case, only to ignore it in the next.
Consider, for example, the frequently arising question of whether a
court may consult a statute’s legislative history when the statute’s text is
unambiguous. At times—particularly in cases where it does not really
matter, because legislative history supports the apparent meaning of
statutory text—the Supreme Court forbids this practice in apparently
uncompromising language, such as, “[w]hen the words of a statute are
unambiguous, . . . judicial inquiry is complete,”222 or “when the statute’s
language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the
disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to
its terms.”223 But in other cases, the Court contents itself with the more
moderate statement that “[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention
to the contrary, [statutory] language must ordinarily be regarded as
conclusive”224 or with noting that only a “most extraordinary showing” of
intention in legislative history will justify departure from clear statutory
text.225 In at least some cases where apparently clear statutory text is truly
at odds with purposes that may be deduced from legislative history, the
Court unblushingly consults the history.226
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history supports the statutory text).
223

Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004).

224

United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 497 (1997) (quoting Consumer Product Safety
Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) ).
225

Salinas v. U.S., 522 U.S. 52, 57 (1997).

226

E.g., General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 586-89 (2004)
(consulting legislative history in determining that the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act’s prohibition on “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s age,” 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(1), prohibits only discrimination based on old
age, not discrimination in favor of older workers and against younger ones); id. at 603
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (complaining that “[t]he plain language of the ADEA clearly
allows for suits brought by the relatively young when discriminated against in favor of
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The Court also issues diametrically opposed pronouncements about
proper ways of using legislative history in those cases in which it is
consulted. For example, the Court has contradicted itself on the question
of whether, in determining whether a statutory amendment made a
possibly surprising change in a statutory scheme, a court may rely on the
absence of any acknowledgment of the change in the amendment’s
legislative history. In Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc.,227 the Court
strongly cautioned against reliance on such “negative” legislative history.
The Court said, “[i]n ascertaining the meaning of a statute, a court cannot,
in the manner of Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did
not bark.”228 Yet in the later case of Chisom v. Roemer,229 the Court
rejected a particular statutory construction “because we are convinced that
if Congress had such an intent, . . . at least some of the Members would
have identified or mentioned it at some point in the unusually extensive
legislative history.”230 For good measure, the Court added, “Congress’s
silence in this regard can be likened to the dog that did not bark.”231 The
the relatively old.”); see also Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 514-518 & 518 n.12
(1993) (stating that it is permissible to consult legislative history even where “[t]he
statutory command . . . is unambiguous, unequivocal, and unlimited”); I.N.S. v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987) (consulting legislative history even though “the
plain language of this statute appears to settle the question before us”); United States v.
American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543-544 (1940) (“When aid to
construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly
can be no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on
‘superficial examination.’”).
227

446 U.S. 578 (1980).

228

Id. at 592.

229

501 U.S. 380 (1991).

230

Id. at 396.

231

Id. at 396 n.23. Sherlock Holmes enthusiasts will recognize the allusion to Silver
Blaze, but will also know that the commonplace reference to “the dog that didn’t bark,”
while more suitable for one-line use than the actual original, loses something of the
original’s brilliance. In the original story, Holmes is trying to solve the mysterious
disappearance of Silver Blaze, a racehorse, which was kidnapped from its stall one night
shortly before a big race. In the course of his investigation, Holmes questions a stable
lad, and learns that several sheep kept by the stable have recently gone lame. Holmes
chuckles and calls this “singular epidemic among the sheep” to the attention of the
official police representative, Inspector Gregory:
I saw by the Inspector’s face that his attention had been keenly aroused.
“You consider that to be important?” he asked.
“Exceedingly so.”
“Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention?”
“To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.”
“The dog did nothing in the night-time.”
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Court thus disregarded its specific, apparently unqualified prohibition on
the use of precisely this interpretive technique, and even its rejection of
this specific interpretive metaphor.
Similarly, the Court has contradicted itself with regard to the role that
a statute’s overall purpose should play in its interpretation. In Rodriguez
v. United States,232 the Court referred to a lower court’s reliance on overall
purpose as “most impermissibl[e].”233 The Court explained the fallacy
inherent in such reliance: “[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all
costs. . . . [I]t frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent
simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s primary
objective must be the law.”234 Just a few years later, however, in Babbitt
v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,235 the Court
rejected a strong textual argument236 by relying in part on “the broad
purpose” of the statute at hand.237 Justice Scalia plaintively responded, “I
thought we had renounced the vice of ‘simplistically assum[ing] that
whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be the law.’”238
The Court sometimes makes flat statements such as “[i]t is beyond our
province to rescue Congress from its drafting errors.”239 At other times,
however, the Court does exactly that.240 Even Justice Scalia accepts that
courts may correct scrivener’s errors on appropriate, albeit rare,
occasions.241
“That was the curious incident,” remarked Sherlock Holmes.
Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in 2 WILLIAM S. BARING-GOULD, THE ANNOTATED
SHERLOCK HOLMES 277 (1967). The phrase “the dog that didn’t bark” never appears in
the original story. Thus, “the dog that did nothing” would be a truer reference to the
original, but even a Sherlockian purist would have to admit that “the dog that didn’t bark”
makes more sense for an audience that might be unfamiliar with the original story. Cf.
MARK HADDON, THE CURIOUS INCIDENT OF THE DOG IN THE NIGHT-TIME (2003).
232

480 U.S. 522 (1987) (per curiam).

233

Id. at 525 (emphasis added).

234

Id. at 525-26.

235

515 U.S. 687 (1995).

236

Id. at 715-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

237

Id. at 698 (emphasis added).

238

Id. at 726 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

239

Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004) (internal quotation omitted).

240

E.g., United States Nat. Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc.,
508 U.S. 439, 455, 462 (1993) (correcting “a simple scrivener’s error” that caused
“punctuation marks [to be] misplaced”).
241

Holloway v. U.S., 526 U.S. 1, 19 n.2 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Green v. Bock
Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528-529 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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Nor are these methodological inconsistencies simply the inevitable
result of cycling and voting paradoxes on a multi-member Court.
Individual Justices also demonstrate methodological inconsistency. For
example, Justice Scalia typically is the Court’s strongest vote to support
the Chevron principle that an ambiguous provision in an administrative
agency’s organic statute constitutes a delegation of power to the agency to
resolve the ambiguity, regardless of the reason why the ambiguity may
have occurred.242 Yet even he quietly joined the Court’s opinion in Food
& Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,243 in
which the Court determined that in some, extraordinary cases, a court can
simply tell that a matter is so important that it is unlikely that Congress
would have left it for an agency to decide.244 Thus, individual Justices,
like the Court as a whole, seem to lack truly firm methodological
commitments.245
The Court’s statutory interpretation cases raise a nice issue with regard
to the scope of stare decisis. The Court has said that, “[w]hen an opinion
issues for the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions of the
opinion necessary to that result by which we are bound.”246 As shown
above, however, the Court’s actual cases make clear that when the Court
issues opinions interpreting statutes, stare decisis effect attaches to the
ultimate holding as to the meaning of the particular statute interpreted, but
not to general methodological pronouncements, no matter how apparently
firm. One might well ask why the Court regards itself as less bound by its
decisions regarding methods than by the results of the methods as

242

See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984) (listing various possible reasons why an ambiguity might occur in a statute and
stating, “[f]or judicial purposes, it matters not which of these things occurred”); United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 257 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Chevron sets forth an
across-the-board presumption . . . . Ambiguity means Congress intended agency
discretion.”); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 454-55 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (objecting to the Court’s suggestion that Chevron deference
would not apply to a “pure question of statutory construction”); N.L.R.B. v. United Food
and Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 134 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(reiterating that the test for Chevron deference is simply whether a statute is silent or
ambiguous).
243

529 U.S. 120 (2000).

244

Id. at 159-60.

245

Similarly, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, recently
complained in a dissenting opinion that the Court was not properly following the strong
unitary principle. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1819 & n.5 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). As noted in the text immediately infra, all four of these Justices have
previously embraced the polymorphic principle.
246

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996).
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applied.247
That question, however, interesting though it is, is reserved for some
other article. For present purposes, it suffices to note that the Court’s
apparently unqualified rejection of the polymorphic principle in Clark v.
Martinez cannot be taken as binding for the future. Although occasions
for application of the polymorphic principle arise infrequently, one may
expect to see some future opinion in which the Court reverts to form and
applies the polymorphic principle.
This prospect seems particularly likely when one takes a closer look at
the voting patterns of the Justices involved. Justice Scalia might be
expected to adhere to the strong unitary principle for the future—as noted,
he applied it in Martinez, even though doing so yielded a result he surely
disfavors, as shown by his dissent in Zadvydas. Looking, however, at the
six other Justices who joined Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in
Martinez, we can see that all six have also written or joined opinions
applying the polymorphic principle. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice
Breyer, evinced strongly implied constitutional avoidance polymorphism
in her concurrence in Vermont Agency. Justice Souter, joined by Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, urged the use of express stare decisis
polymorphism in Bossier Parish. And Justices O’Connor and Kennedy
joined Justice White’s opinion applying express subconstitutional
polymorphism in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police. Even the
Chief Justice, who dissented in Clark v. Martinez, joined the Court in
Illinois Council, which used express constitutional avoidance
polymorphism, and in Richmond, which used express policy
polymorphism.
It seems likely, therefore, that Justice Scalia is the Court’s sole firm
believer in the strong unitary principle.248 The other Justices who joined
247

Rosenkranz observes that “the Justices do not seem to treat methodology as part of the
holding of case law.” Rosenkranz, supra note 5, at 2144. He points out that Justice
Scalia, for example, does not consider himself bound by the Court’s frequent
demonstration that it regards legislative history as a legitimate tool of statutory
construction. Id. The examples given in the text show that the matter goes beyond
individual Justices. The Court itself does not seem to regard cases as setting binding
precedent concerning methodology.
248

Justice Thomas, in his dissenting opinion in Clark v. Martinez, professes adherence to
the unitary principle, see 125 S. Ct. at 730 (Thomas, J., dissenting), and attempts to
characterize his understanding of the statute at issue as involving “a single and
unchanging, if implausible, meaning.” Id. Still, this reading, that “the detention period
authorized by § 1231(a)(6) depends not only on the circumstances surrounding a
removal, but also on the type of alien ordered removed,” id., involves the kind of verbal
trick discussed earlier, under which any interpretation of any statute could be
characterized as unitary by reading sufficient nuance into the critical term or phrase.
Effectively, Justice Thomas advocates a polymorphic reading of the statute. (In fairness,
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Justice Scalia’s opinion in Martinez approve of the result, but are unlikely
to consider themselves firmly bound by the case’s methodology. The
polymorphic principle will probably prevail again.
B. Practical Polymorphic Advice
Given that polymorphism is probably going to return, it is appropriate
to consider how it should be used in practice. This section attempts to set
forth some guidelines for the use of the polymorphic principle.
The guidelines, of course, cannot provide a perfect, mechanically
applicable rule that tells courts exactly when to apply the polymorphic
principle. But that is not troubling. There is no perfect rule that tells
courts when to depart from the general canon that terms or phrases
appearing multiple times in a single statute should bear the same meaning
each time, but courts manage all the same. They exercise judgment in
determining when incongruities that would result from applying the canon
outweigh its natural force. The same is true with regard to the
polymorphic principle. The only ultimate guideline is that the unitary
principle is the general rule, but that incongruities that result from
applying it to a particular statute may cause a court to conclude that the
statute demands application of the polymorphic principle.
That said, a couple of thoughts regarding practical application of the
polymorphic principle may be noted. First, the principle seems most
appropriate when some special rule of statutory interpretation, which
deflects courts from the most natural interpretation of statutory text,
applies to one application of a statutory phrase but not to others. Thus, it
is not surprising to find the polymorphic principle appearing most
commonly in cases involving constitutional avoidance or other, special,
subconstitutional rules of interpretation.249 In straightforward situations
where no such special rule applies, the unitary principle seems more
appropriate. Thus, for example, in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which grants
district courts the diversity jurisdiction in cases involving four possible
party configurations provided the amount in controversy “exceeds the sum
or value of $75,000,” one would strongly expect that the amount-incontroversy requirement would apply uniformly, inasmuch as there is no
special rule of interpretation that applies to the amount requirement’s
interaction with just one of the party configurations.
Second, where a special rule does deflect a court from the most natural
reading of a statutory phrase with regard to one application, and the court
therefore needs to decide whether the special reading should apply to all
one should note that Justice Thomas really wanted the Court to overrule its prior decision
in Zadvydas and adopt a unitary reading of the statute that would permit indefinite
detention of aliens in any of the statute’s categories. Id. at 736.)
249

See supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2.
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applications, the court might find guidance in considering which is the
primary application of the statute and which the unusual case. If the
special construction principle applies to the statute’s main application, it
might be more appropriate to carry that reading over to all applications,
but if the special principle applies to the less central application, it might
be most appropriate to read the statute polymorphically, so that the main
application is not infected by the special case.
Thus, under this guideline, perhaps the most appropriate application of
the polymorphic principle in the cases discussed earlier would be that of
Library of Congress v. Shaw, which concerned the award of interest on
attorney’s fees under Title VII. Title VII applies to both private
employers and to the federal government, but in terms of simple numbers,
its application to cases of private employment must surely be expected to
dwarf its application to cases against the federal government, because the
private sector is so much larger. If the courts have determined that awards
of interest are essential in cases against private parties in order for the
purposes of Title VII to be fully realized, it would be inappropriate to let
the relatively special case of the federal government, where a special rule
makes interest unavailable, control the statute’s main application.
This guideline might also suggest that courts should not feel as
strongly obliged to adhere to the unitary principle as they have in the one
area where the matter has received much attention, namely, the case of
statutes that impose civil and criminal penalties on the same conduct.
With regard to some of these statutes, such as the Racketeer Influenced
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), application of the unitary principle
seems appropriate. Criminal enforcement is a central theme of RICO. To
the extent that the rule of lenity might suggest narrowing RICO’s
provisions, that narrowing would occur in RICO’s main arena. On the
other hand, consider a statute as to which enforcement is overwhelmingly
civil and any criminal penalties are a rarely-invoked statutory detail. As to
such statutes, it would seem odd to deny the statute the full effect that
would follow from giving its provisions the best reading, just because the
rare criminal prosecution might demand a narrower reading. Indeed,
application of the unitary principle creates the paradox that, although
Congress would probably imagine itself to be strengthening a statute by
adding criminal penalties to it, in some respects the addition of such
penalties has the effect of weakening the statute, because courts may then
feel obliged to apply the rule of lenity even when applying the statute in
civil cases. This curious paradox suggests that courts should be somewhat
more open to applying the polymorphic principle in such situations.
Fortunately, as Professor Lawrence Solan has observed, the issue is
often, as a practical matter, taken care of by the institutional structures that
arise with regard to enforcement of such “mixed” statutes. Courts may
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give the statute its most natural reading in civil cases, despite the pull of
the rule of lenity. Nonetheless, the institution of prosecutorial discretion
may tend to ensure that the government brings criminal prosecutions only
in cases presenting the most obvious and egregious statutory violations.
Such prosecutorial practices mimic the rule of lenity. Under such an
institutional structure, the effect of the polymorphic principle is
achieved—the statute is given the best reading in civil cases and the rule
of lenity is, in effect, applied to criminal cases—even though the courts
do not expressly invoke the polymorphic principle.250
C. The Role of Congress
Finally, it is appropriate to consider the role of Congress with regard to
the polymorphic principle. Indeed, in Martinez, the Court suggested that
protecting Congress was one of the reasons for its adoption of the strong
unitary principle. The Court asserted that the polymorphic principle
would not only be “novel” and “dangerous,” but that it would be “beyond
the power of Congress to remedy.”251
Whatever the value of the Court’s other arguments, this one is
certainly incorrect. Congress has authority to prescribe rules of statutory
interpretation.252 Congress could include, in any particular statute, a
“unitary principle” provision, which could specify that “each term or
phrase in this statute has, with regard to any single time it appears, a single
meaning.” Congress’s power to include such a provision in any single
statute could be no more controversial than its power to include a
“definitions” section, which is universally accepted.
Moreover, what Congress can do with regard to each particular statute,
it could also do by means of one, general statute. If Congress desired to
pass a “Strong Unitary Principle Act,” it could, by that single statute,
specify that courts should understand all of its statutes to embody the
strong unitary principle. Some scholars have occasionally suggested that
such general interpretive statutes would impermissibly encroach on the
judicial power,253 but, as I have explained in detail elsewhere, such
arguments are implausible and contrary to precedent.254 Even if,
somehow, Congress lacked the power to prescribe the strong unitary
principle as a general rule of interpretation for the future, it could certainly
pass one statute that amends all existing statutes so as to prescribe the
250

Solan, supra note 6, at 2218-37.

251

125 S. Ct. at 727.

252

Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers,
53 Vand. L. Rev. 1457, 1500-05 (2000); see also Rosenkranz, supra note 5, at 2102-40.
253

See Siegel, supra note 252, at 1501.

254

Id. at 1501-03.
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strong unitary principle as a rule for their construction. Thus, at the very
least, Congress, if it did not care for the polymorphic principle, could
block its use by first passing one statute to cover the existing corpus of
federal statutory law and by then including the strong unitary principle as
a boilerplate part of the “definitions” section of each subsequently-enacted
statute. Contrariwise, Congress could also expressly authorize courts to
do what they do anyway—apply the polymorphic principle where
appropriate.
The Supreme Court is wrong, therefore, to suggest that it must avoid
the polymorphic principle in order to protect Congress from something
beyond Congress’s power to correct. Indeed, subject to the usual caveat
about the dangers of drawing inferences from congressional silence,
Congress’s failure to repudiate the polymorphic principle, in the face of
the courts’ use of it over the years, might be taken as indicating that
Congress does not object to it. Perhaps Congress thinks that the courts are
doing a good job by generally following the dictate of the weak unitary
principle but deviating from that principle on appropriate, infrequent
occasions. In any event, Congress could codify the strong unitary
principle if it desired to do so.
But should it? Probably not. As noted earlier, the essence of the
canons of construction is their generality. They apply to the whole
universe of potential statutes. The reason that the canons are only general
guides is that it is difficult to find a principle of construction that reaches
truly sound results in every case. It is impossible to anticipate every
statutory circumstance to which a canon might someday apply. Codifying
the strong unitary principle would surely lead to unfortunate results in
some future case in which Congress does not fully realize the difficulties
of unitary construction of some particular statutory text. There is just no
way of entirely eliminating the need for judgment to be exercised by the
agents who apply the statutes to particular cases, i.e., the courts.
Probably, therefore, it is best for Congress to leave things as they are.
The good sense of the unitary principle will guarantee that it will always
remain the basic, general interpretive guide. In exceptional cases, the
courts will exercise their sound judgment to determine that a particular
statute calls for application of the polymorphic principle.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court erred both descriptively and normatively in Clark
v. Martinez. As a descriptive matter, it is simply not true to assert that the
polymorphic principle is “novel.” Nor, as a normative matter, is it
“dangerous.” In appropriate cases, the polymorphic principle can be a
proper exercise of sound judicial discretion.
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It is an error to believe that the process of statutory interpretation can
ever be mechanized or reduced to a set of determinate, nondiscretionary
rules. Any attempt to do so is likely to provide only the illusion of
objectivity while maintaining the necessity for judicial choice. We should
not be ashamed of judicial choice. Appropriately limited judicial choice
has been a feature of the judicial power since the beginning, and it plays a
vital role in our system of government. Certainly our system allows, and
indeed demands, the range of judicial choice necessary to implement the
polymorphic principle.
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